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Discussion Memorandum
Executive Summary
As part of its "Objective and Mission,” the Independence Standards Board (ISB) is
committed “to develop a conceptual framework for independence applicable to audits of
public entities which will serve as the foundation for the development of principles-based
independence standards.” This Discussion Memorandum (DM) is the first step in a process
that will culminate in the development of a conceptual framework for auditor independence.
Readers are asked to respond to general questions as well as more specific questions about the
usefulness and completeness of the various components of a conceptual framework that are
discussed in the DM and about their views on alternative formulations of those components.
The ISB will consider the comments received on this DM and, after deliberation, issue for
public comment an Exposure Draft, which will then be followed by a final conceptual
framework document or documents.

A conceptual framework for auditor independence is intended to

•
help the ISB meet its responsibilities to set sound and internally consistent
independence standards by providing direction and structure for resolving
independence issues and questions
•
help stakeholders in auditor independence understand the significance of
auditor independence and the various processes that are in place to ensure it
•
focus debate and serve as boundaries for discussions about auditor
independence issues, thereby helping stakeholders contribute to the development of,
and better understand the rationale underlying, ISB standards

The DM should stimulate discussion about alternative goals, definitions, and concepts
of auditor independence, and about the role that the perceptions of various stakeholders play
in the development of independence standards. Consistent with the objectives of the federal
securities acts, however, the Board’s mission is more narrowly focused on establishing
independence standards applicable to audits of public companies in order to serve the public
interest and to protect and promote the confidence of investors in the securities markets. The
breadth of the issues raised in this DM is not intended to suggest that the Board’s primary
focus in setting independence standards will change in the future.

i

The DM is designed to be a neutral document. Where appropriate, it discusses issues
from different points of view in order to stimulate constructive dialogue. In some instances,
only single points of view are expressed because the ISB has not been able to develop
operational alternatives to those views. In those cases, respondents are encouraged to
describe alternative viewpoints.

The DM covers the importance of reliable financial statements to the capital markets
and to various groups of stakeholders, regulation of the auditing profession in the United
States, and various environmental factors that may create pressures on auditor independence,
alleviate those pressures, and motivate auditors and auditing firms to maintain their
independence. The DM notes that quality audits help ensure financial statement reliability.
The level of audit quality is a function of many factors, including the personal attributes that
individual auditors bring to an engagement. Auditor independence is only one factor and does
not, by itself, produce a quality audit or guarantee that audit failures will not occur. To
provide a context for understanding the audit process and how auditor independence relates to
that process, the DM describes aspects of the environment in which audits take place.
The DM discusses alternative goals of auditor independence. Those goals could be
expressed in terms of helping ensure that auditors are willing to exercise appropriate personal
attributes—such as competence, diligence, integrity, and objectivity—for the purpose of
improving the reliability of audited financial statements. Alternatively, they could be
expressed in terms of helping ensure that auditors do not engage in activities or have
relationships that may impair independence. The goals also could include helping ensure that
users and other stakeholders perceive that those goals have been achieved, as a way to
enhance the credibility of audited financial statements and improve stakeholder confidence.

The DM describes alternative sets of definitions of auditor independence based on the
alternative goals. One set is based on a “personal attributes approach” and another on an
“activities and relationships approach.” Definitions that include explicit reference to
stakeholders’ perceptions also are presented.
The alternative definitions of independence are based on the assumption that certain
factors—referred to as threats to auditor independence—may have a negative effect on
auditor behavior. Threats arise from numerous and diverse pressures, activities, and
relationships in the auditing environment. The possibility that a negative effect will result
suggests the existence of risk—referred to as independence risk—that a threat may impair
auditor independence. That negative effect could be avoided or mitigated, however, if one or
more controls—referred to as safeguards to auditor independence—exist or are put in place.
Safeguards to auditor independence exist in the environment in which audits are performed or
are mandated by regulators, standard setters, or firms in response to threats to auditor
independence. The DM discusses factors that may affect the significance of threats and the
effectiveness of safeguards. It also considers whether stakeholder perceptions and the
benefits and costs of independence should be included as concepts of auditor independence.
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The DM examines basic principles of auditor independence based on the above
concepts and asks for respondents’ views on those principles:
Basic Principle 1: Different types of threats to auditor independence—including self
interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity (or trust), and intimidation—arise in
different circumstances.

Basic Principle 2: The significance of threats created in specific circumstances affects
the level of independence risk.

Basic Principle 3: Different types of safeguards—including prohibitions, restrictions,
other policies and procedures, and disclosures—can mitigate or eliminate threats to
auditor independence.
Basic Principle 4: The effectiveness of the design and operation of various safeguards
affects the level of independence risk.

Basic Principle 5: The ISB should assess the level of independence risk by considering
the significance of the threats to auditor independence created by specific
circumstances and the effectiveness of the safeguards that mitigate or eliminate those
threats when it develops standards for auditor independence.
Basic Principle 6: The ISB should determine whether, in the specific circumstances
under consideration, the level of independence risk is acceptably low.
Basic Principle 7: The ISB should consider which individuals in an auditing firm (as
well as the firm itself) are affected by one or more threats to auditor independence in
the specific circumstances under consideration and whether one or more safeguards
effectively mitigate or eliminate those threats.

Basic Principle 8: The ISB should weigh the costs of alternative safeguards against the
benefits of reduced independence risk resulting from those safeguards when it
develops standards for auditor independence.

The DM also discusses factors that may affect perceptions of auditor independence
and notes that different stakeholder groups and different individuals within a particular
stakeholder group may have different perceptions about auditors and matters related to auditor
independence. The DM describes several alternatives for a ninth basic principle of auditor
independence to address the role of stakeholders’ perceptions in the ISB’s standard-setting
process. Each of those alternatives could lead to a basic principle of auditor independence
that addresses how the ISB should consider stakeholders’ perceptions in setting independence
standards. Such a principle could be expressed as one of the following:

iii

Basic Principle 9A: The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders and develop
independence standards that reflect stakeholders’ perceptions.

Basic Principle 9B: The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders but develop
independence standards that reflect the likely perceptions of a hypothetical group of
stakeholders, namely, “reasonable, fully informed users of financial statements.”
Basic Principle 9C: The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders and be
informed by stakeholders’ perceptions, but develop independence standards based on
the ISB’s judgment about how best to meet the goal or goals of auditor independence.
The DM concludes by noting that, regardless of the ISB’s eventual conclusions about
stakeholders’ perceptions, effective communication between the ISB and stakeholders can
help shape stakeholders’ opinions about ISB standards and the process by which those
standards are promulgated and, ultimately, enhance stakeholders’ confidence in financial
statement reliability and the independence of auditors in general.
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Summary of Questions for Respondents

The DM asks for responses to the following questions:

Question I-1: Do you believe that a conceptual framework for auditor independence
that contains goals, definitions, concepts, and basic principles will be useful to the
ISB? Are there other components that should be included in a conceptual framework?
Please explain your views.

Question I-2: Do you believe that the conceptual framework components discussed in
this DM will be useful to stakeholders other than the ISB? Please explain your views.
Question I-3: Should the ISB consider the interests of all stakeholders when it sets
independence standards? If stakeholders or stakeholder groups have competing
interests, whose interests should prevail?
Question II-1: Are there factors related to the audit environment, other than those
discussed in Section II, that are relevant to, and should be considered in, a conceptual
framework for auditor independence? If so, please describe those factors and their
relevance to auditor independence.

Question III-1: Which of the goals described in Section III should form the basis for
the goal or goals of auditor independence to be included in a conceptual framework?
Please explain your views and discuss other goals that should be considered.
Question IV-1: Which of the alternatives described in Section IV should form the
basis for a definition of auditor independence to be included in a conceptual
framework? Please explain your views and discuss other definitions or approaches to
defining auditor independence that should be considered.
Question V-l: Do you believe that the concepts discussed in Section
V—independence risk, threats to auditor independence and their significance,
safeguards to auditor independence and their effectiveness, stakeholders’ perceptions
in independence considerations, and benefits and costs of auditor independence—are
useful and should be included in a conceptual framework? What other concepts, if
any, would be useful? Please explain your views.
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Question VI-1: Do you believe that the principles described in Section VI will be
useful to the ISB in developing future standards? Please explain your views and
discuss other types of guidance that you believe would make the conceptual
framework more useful to the ISB or to other stakeholders.
Question VI-2: Do you believe that it is useful to analyze threats based on their nature
and significance? Please explain your views and discuss types of threats other than
those identified in Section VI that should be considered in a conceptual framework for
auditor independence.
Question VI-3: Do you believe that it is useful to analyze safeguards based on their
type and effectiveness? Please explain your views and discuss types of safeguards
other than those identified in Section that should be considered in a conceptual
framework for auditor independence.
Question VI-4: Do you believe that the ISB should consider which individuals in an
auditing firm (as well as the firm itself) are affected by one or more threats to auditor
independence in the specific circumstances under consideration and by one or more
safeguards that effectively mitigate or eliminate those threats? Please explain your
views.
Question VI-5: Do you believe that the ISB should weigh the costs of alternative
safeguards against the benefits of reduced independence risk resulting from those
safeguards when it develops new independence standards? Why or why not? Please
discuss your views about how the ISB should measure the costs and benefits of
alternative safeguards.
Question VII-1: Are there aspects of stakeholders’ perceptions other than those
discussed in this DM that are relevant to, and should be considered in, a conceptual
framework for auditor independence? If so, please describe them and their relevance
to auditor independence.
Question VII-2: Which of the alternatives described in Section VII, if any, should
form the basis for a basic principle related to consideration of stakeholders’
perceptions to be included in a conceptual framework? Please explain your views.
Question VII-3: Are there ways other than those noted in the alternative basic
principles described in Section VII by which the ISB could consider stakeholders’
perceptions in its standard-setting process? If so, please describe them.
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SECTION I —INTRODUCTION
1.
The mission of the Independence Standards Board (ISB) is to develop, through a public
process, concepts, principles, and standards of auditor independence. Compliance with those
concepts, principles, and standards is expected, among other things, to offer assurance to
various stakeholders in auditor independence1 that auditors who attest to the financial
statements of public entities are independent. As part of its “Objective and Mission,” the
ISB is committed “to develop a conceptual framework for independence applicable to audits
of public entities which will serve as the foundation for the development of principles-based
independence standards.” The ISB is issuing this Discussion Memorandum (DM) to
encourage interested groups and individuals to submit written comments on issues related to
developing a conceptual framework for auditor independence.
2.
The DM should stimulate discussion about alternative goals, definitions, and concepts
of auditor independence, and about the role that the perceptions of various stakeholders play
in the development of independence standards. Consistent with the objectives of the federal
securities acts, however, the Board’s mission is more narrowly focused on establishing
independence standards applicable to audits of public companies in order to serve the public
interest and to protect and promote the confidence of investors in the securities markets. The
breadth of the issues raised in this DM is not intended to suggest that the Board’s primary
focus in setting independence standards will change in the future.

Purposes Served by a Conceptual Framework
3.
A conceptual framework for auditor independence is expected to serve several
purposes:

• help the ISB meet its responsibilities to set sound and internally consistent
independence standards by providing direction and structure for resolving
independence issues and questions
• help stakeholders understand the significance of auditor independence and the
various processes that are in place to ensure it

• focus debate and serve as boundaries for discussions about auditor independence
issues, thereby helping stakeholders contribute to the development of, and better
understand the rationale underlying, ISB standards

1 Words and phrases that appear in the Glossary are set in boldface type the first time they are used in the
Discussion Memorandum.
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4.
The conceptual framework is not intended, by itself, to resolve auditor independence
issues and will not amend, modify, or interpret existing independence rules. The ISB
recognizes, however, that some of those rules may be inconsistent with elements of the
framework. In due course, the ISB expects to reexamine existing rules governing auditor
independence to deal with any such inconsistencies.

Project Steps
5.
The ISB’s conceptual framework project is being developed in accordance with its
established due process. This document represents the first step in that process—the
issuance of a DM soliciting public comment on issues related to the framework’s
development. Where appropriate, issues are discussed from different points of view in order
to stimulate constructive dialogue. In some parts of the DM, only a single point of view is
expressed because the ISB has not been able to develop operational alternatives to those
views. In those cases, respondents are encouraged to describe alternative viewpoints.

6.
This DM first describes the environment in which auditors practice and the importance
of auditing to the capital markets. Subsequent sections consider the goals of auditor
independence and definitions of independence based on those goals. The final sections discuss
auditor independence concepts and basic principles that the ISB could use in resolving specific
independence issues.
7.
The ISB will consider comments received on this DM and, after deliberation, issue for
public comment an Exposure Draft of a proposed conceptual framework for auditor
independence. After considering the comments it receives, the ISB will issue its conceptual
framework document or documents.

Questions for Respondents
8.
At the beginning of each subsequent section of this DM, questions are posed to
encourage respondents to comment on specific issues. In addition, all respondents are asked
to include their views concerning (a) the usefulness of a conceptual framework for auditor
independence and (b) how the ISB should consider competing stakeholder interests. The
following three questions may be helpful in structuring those responses:

Question I-1: Do you believe that a conceptual framework for auditor
independence that contains goals, definitions, concepts, and basic principles will
be useful to the ISB? Are there other components that should be included in a
conceptual framework? Please explain your views.
Question I-2: Do you believe that the conceptual framework components
discussed in this DM will be useful to stakeholders other than the ISB? Please
explain your views.
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Question I-3: Should the ISB consider the interests of all stakeholders when it
sets independence standards? If stakeholders or stakeholder groups have
competing interests, whose interests should prevail?
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SECTION II —THE AUDIT ENVIRONMENT AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
9.
This section describes aspects of the environment in which audits take place to help
readers understand the audit process and how auditor independence relates to that process.
The aspects include: the importance of auditing to the capital markets and to various groups of
stakeholders, the regulation of the auditing profession in the United States, and factors
affecting auditor independence.

10.

The basic question raised by this section is:

Question II-1: Are there factors related to the audit environment, other than
those discussed in this section, that are relevant to, and should be considered in,
a conceptual framework for auditor independence? If so, please describe those
factors and their relevance to auditor independence.

Importance of Auditing to the Capital Markets2
11.
There is widespread agreement that audited financial statements are an important
component of the financial information that is available to the capital markets. Audits add
value to financial statements by improving their reliability. Audits improve financial
statement reliability because management of the auditee3 corrects the statements to reflect
knowledge that an auditor4*6obtains during the audit and communicates to it, but that
previously had not been reflected appropriately in the financial statements. Even when audits
do not result in corrections to the statements, they make financial statements more reliable by
motivating auditee management (a) to avoid misstatements in the first place (because it knows
that the statements will be subject to correction as a result of the audit) and (b) to consult with
auditors about how to account for complex transactions before those transactions are
recorded.5,6 Improved financial statement reliability reduces information risk. Reduced
2 This part of Section II focuses on the values or benefits of an audit. There are also costs associated with audits,
but only the costs of auditor independence (discussed in Sections V and VI) are relevant for this DM.
3There has been considerable debate in the auditing literature on the question, “Who is the client?” For
example, the report of the Public Oversight Board’s Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, Strengthening the
Professionalism of the Independent Auditor (New York: Public Oversight Board, 1994), recommends that the
auditor consider the board of directors, not management, as the client. This DM uses the term “auditee,” rather
than “client,” to denote the entity whose financial statements are being audited.
4As discussed in Section VI, the composition of the class contemplated by the term “auditor” may be specified
by the ISB in the context of specific independence standards.
5Kinney and Martin analyzed previously published studies on audit-related adjustments and concluded that “the
year-end audit is seen as directly reducing positive bias in preaudit net earnings and net assets as well as
improving the precision of measurement” (William D. Kinney, Jr., and Roger D. Martin, “Does Auditing
Reduce Bias in Financial Reporting? A Review of Audit-Related Adjustment Studies,” Auditing: A Journal of
Practice & Theory [Spring 1994], pp. 149-56). The research summarized in this study included audits of both
public and private entities and a wide range of industries, entity sizes, auditing firms, and time periods.
6 It should be recognized that an auditor’s ability to improve the reliability of financial statements is limited by
the nature of the audit process. Audit evidence may be persuasive but rarely is conclusive, and even persuasive
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information risk helps to lower the cost of capital to auditees; it also helps to improve the
decisions of users of financial statements, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the capital
markets in allocating resources.

12.
Financial statement reliability is likely to improve when an auditor performs a quality
audit. The level of audit quality is a function of many factors, including the personal
attributes that individual auditors bring to an engagement. Auditor independence is only one
of those factors. Accordingly, independence alone does not produce a quality audit, nor does
it guarantee that audit failures will not occur.

13.
Controls within firms, the auditing profession, and society also affect the level of audit
quality. Those controls include the entire system of public regulation and self-regulation of
the profession, including an auditing firm’s system of quality control. Auditor independence,
and the controls that operate to ensure independence, are only one source, albeit an important
source, of quality audits and improved financial statement reliability.
14.
Audits also are important to the capital markets because they enhance the credibility
of financial statements.7 In the context of financial statements, credibility means that
stakeholders in auditor independence believe that an entity’s financial position, results of
operations, and cash flows are presented fairly in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) in all material respects—that is, that stakeholders perceive the
financial statements to be more reliable because they were audited.8 Stakeholders’ confidence
in the reliability of the financial statements may affect their perceptions of information risk
and their resource-allocation decisions.

Stakeholders in Auditor Independence
15.
Many individuals and groups have an interest in, and benefit from, reliable financial
statements and the quality audits that help to ensure them. External users of financial
statements—including current and potential investors, creditors, and others—want reliable
financial statements on which to base their resource-allocation decisions. Quality audits help

evidence is obtainable only at a cost. Additional auditing procedures might increase the persuasiveness of the
evidence obtained, but at a cost that might exceed the benefit of the additional procedures. Moreover, the
characteristics of fraud—such as concealment, collusion, and falsified documents—limit an auditor’s ability to
improve financial statement reliability.
7 There are other benefits that flow from audits of financial statements. For example, auditors often
communicate suggestions for improving internal control to auditees’ managements and audit committees.
Because those benefits are not related to the mission of the ISB, they are not addressed in this DM.
8 Researchers who use a contracting perspective to study auditor independence express this notion somewhat
differently. For example, DeAngelo notes that “the ex ante value of an audit to consumers of audit services
(which include current and potential owners, managers, consumers of the firm’s products, etc.) depends on
the auditor’s perceived ability to (1) discover errors or breaches in the accounting system, and (2) withstand
client pressures to disclose selectively in the event a breach is discovered” (Linda E. De Angelo, “Auditor
Independence, ‘Low Balling’, and Disclosure Regulation,” Journal ofAccounting and Economics [Vol. 3,
1981], p. 115).
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to provide that reliability, thereby reducing users’ information risk. Auditors’ interests are
served by quality audits because they satisfy auditors’ professional responsibilities under
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and enhance auditors’ professional reputations.
Auditees (including auditee management, audit committees, and boards of directors) have an
interest in quality audits because, by reducing users’ information risk, they help to lower
auditees’ cost of capital. Quality audits also help to ensure that auditee managements meet
their responsibilities to prepare reliable financial statements. Regulators and standard-setters
(including the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], state boards of accountancy,
the ISB, and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA]) can increase
the effectiveness of the capital markets by promulgating rules and regulations that help ensure
that audits improve financial statement reliability. Although individuals in each of these
groups—referred to in this DM as stakeholders in auditor independence—may have different
knowledge and beliefs about auditors and the audit process, they share a common interest in
auditor independence: namely, its importance as one component in the system that helps
ensure quality audits and, ultimately, financial statement reliability.9
16.
Auditing firms, as well as public regulatory and self-regulatory bodies, have developed
rules, policies, and procedures, including many related specifically to auditor independence,
that help maintain audit quality. The major components of the system that regulates the
auditing profession in the United States and their relationship to auditor independence are
discussed in the next subsections.

Regulation of Auditors in the United States
17.
Auditors in the United States are subject to a system of controls that, taken as a whole,
constitutes the oversight or regulation of the profession. Controls that seek to maintain
auditor independence are only one part of the regulatory fabric that has been developed to
help ensure, and to assure stakeholders about, the quality of audits. This subsection describes
briefly the system of public regulation and self-regulation of auditors in the United States,
including aspects of that system directed specifically at auditor independence. The principal
elements of the regulation of auditor independence are state boards of accountancy, the
AICPA, and, for public entities, the SEC and the ISB—a combination of public and self
regulation.

9 “The essence of the stakeholder idea is that those who may be significantly affected by an organization’s
action, or who are potentially at risk as a result, have an obligation-generating ‘stake’ in that decision”
(Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee, Ties that Bind: A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999], p. 235). Although originally used in reference to
business organizations, the term also is used in the business ethics literature to refer to those who have an
interest in other types of entities or in concepts. (See, for example, Lucas D. Introna and Athanasia Pouloudi,
“Privacy in the Information Age: Stakeholders, Interests and Values,” Journal of Business Ethics [Vol. 22,
1999], pp. 27-38.)
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18.
Many stakeholders appear to rely, at least in part, on audited financial statements to
help make decisions.10 Their reliance suggests they believe that organizations and processes
are in place to help ensure quality audits. It is difficult, however, to assess the extent to which
various stakeholders are knowledgeable about specific controls and regulations that help
ensure quality audits. Regulatory bodies and organizations concerned with the quality of
audits take various steps to enable them to identify and respond to stakeholders’ needs and
expectations and thereby enhance confidence in the regulatory process.
19.
Some stakeholder expectations about auditing can reasonably be fulfilled by one or
more bodies or organizations involved in self-regulation. For example, the AICPA on
numerous occasions has increased auditors’ responsibilities in response to the perceived needs
of one or more groups of stakeholders.11 Other stakeholder expectations, however, are best
satisfied through public regulation. For example, a desire for monetary compensation when
there is an audit failure may need to be fulfilled through the legal system. It must be
recognized, however, that some expectations, such as absolute assurance that an audit will
always detect material financial statement misstatements, are simply unachievable or can be
achieved only at a cost that many believe exceeds the related benefit.

Components of Public Regulation
20.
The basis for public regulation of auditors is found in federal and state laws and
regulations that license accountants, specify ethical and technical standards, and enforce
conformity with those laws, regulations, and standards. The components of public regulation
include federal and state legislatures and regulatory agencies, including the SEC and state
boards of accountancy, as well as the federal and state judicial systems. Audits of public
entities must be performed by accountants who are “in good standing” and either “duly
registered” or “entitled to practice” in the jurisdiction in which they live or work.12 Statutory
regulation for registering and licensing accountants is vested in state boards of accountancy.
That regulation serves to protect the public interest by providing:
• reasonable assurance of the competence and moral character of individuals at the
time they are initially licensed to perform regulated services13

10 The results of a comprehensive survey of stockholders’ use of the components of corporate annual reports,
including the financial statements and related information, can be found in Marc J. Epstein and Moses L. Pava,
“The Shareholders’ Use of Corporate Annual Reports,” Vol. 2 in M. J. Epstein (Ed.), Studies in Managerial
and Financial Accounting (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1993).
11 In 1996, the General Accounting Office issued a report, The Accounting Profession, Major Issues: Progress
and Concerns, that included a review of recommendations made and actions taken by various organizations and
bodies between 1972 and 1995 to improve the performance of independent audits of public entities. Although
that report cited ongoing concerns in several areas, including concerns about auditor independence, it
acknowledged that the profession generally had been responsive to recommendations for changes.
12 SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 2-01.
13 Some states also register or license firms to practice within their jurisdictions.
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• reasonable assurance that accountants demonstrate their continued professional
qualifications to maintain or renew their licenses

• a disciplinary system that provides incentives for accountants to meet the
profession’s ethical and technical standards
21.
Federal regulators recognize certain private-sector bodies (such as the ISB) as
promulgators of ethical and technical standards, subject to continuing oversight. State
regulators also recognize certain standard-setting bodies in the private sector. For example,
some state regulations incorporate the code of professional ethics of the AICPA or of the
state’s society of CPAs.

22.
The independence of auditors of public entities has long been a component of public
regulation at the state and federal level. State boards of accountancy have independence
requirements for auditors who are licensed or registered in their jurisdictions. Various federal
legislation, beginning with the Securities Act of 1933, requires (or gives the SEC authority to
require) public entities to retain auditors who are independent. Rule 2-01 of SEC Regulation
S-X contains the current version of those requirements and related guidance concerning how
the determination of “independence” is to be made. The SEC also has published a large
number of interpretations under Rule 2-01; these were reviewed in 1982 and published as part
of the SEC’s “Codification of Financial Reporting Policies.” In addition, interpretive letters
issued by the SEC staff in response to requests from various parties are available to the
public. In 1998, the SEC recognized the ISB (subject to continuing oversight) as the private
sector body with the authority to develop standards for auditor independence and to issue
interpretations of existing rules.14 The SEC intends to continue to enforce compliance with
auditor independence standards, including those promulgated by the ISB.

Components of Self-Regulation

23.
The system of self-regulation of auditors includes controls within the auditing
profession, as well as controls designed and implemented by auditing firms themselves. It is
designed to meet the goals of achieving quality audits and enhancing public perceptions,
confidence, and trust in auditors and in audited financial statements. The system has the
following components:
• Membership standards—requirements that individuals must meet to qualify for
membership in the AICPA, such as continuing professional education requirements,
and that firms must meet to maintain membership in the SEC Practice Section (SECPS)
of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms,15 such as undergoing triennial peer reviews

14 SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 50, The Establishment and Improvement of Standards Related to
Auditor Independence (February 18, 1998).
15 All U.S. firms whose partners are members of the AICPA and that audit SEC registrants must belong to the
SECPS. Approximately 1,300 auditing firms (800 of which audit SEC registrants and 500 other firms that
belong voluntarily) are members of the SECPS. Fewer than 50 U.S. firms that audit SEC registrants, auditing
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• Ethical and technical standards—a code of ethical behavior for individuals;
standards for determining auditor independence, both for auditors generally and
specifically for auditors of financial statements issued by public entities; authoritative
standards and nonauthoritative guidance for conducting audits
• Quality control standards—standards for designing and maintaining systems of
quality controls over auditing services, including, for example, the systems of hiring,
training, promoting, and compensating professional personnel, as well as the “tone at
the top” in the firm; supplemental quality control standards applicable to members of
the SECPS
• Monitoring—oversight (through peer review and other means) of individual and
member firm compliance with established membership, ethical (including
independence), technical, and quality control standards
• Discipline—a disciplinary system that deals with violations of the profession's
membership, ethical (including independence), technical, and quality Control standards
24.
Various bodies and organizations are responsible for carrying out self-regulation. They
include auditing firms, committees and staff of the AICPA, state societies of CPAs, and the
ISB. The AICPA bodies involved in self-regulation of auditors include the Board of Directors,
the Auditing Standards Board, the Board of Examiners, the Professional Ethics Executive
Committee, the Joint Trial Board, the Peer Review Committee, and the SECPS. Many state
societies of CPAs also participate in the self-regulation of the profession in conjunction with
the AICPA, such as through the Joint Ethics Enforcement Program.
25.
The Public Oversight Board (POB) provides independent oversight of the profession’s
self-regulatory programs for SECPS members. It monitors and evaluates the activities of the
SECPS and its committees to ensure their effectiveness. It also monitors and may comment
publicly on matters that relate to the overall quality of auditing and financial reporting out of a
belief that “it would ill serve the public interest if the profession’s quality control programs
were a model of integrity and effectiveness while other forces and circumstances destroyed the
public’s confidence in the credibility of financial reporting in the United States.”16

26.
Various bodies and organizations within the auditing profession have issued a large
number of rules and regulations dealing with auditor independence. By the early 1940s, the
American Institute of Accountants (predecessor to the AICPA) had incorporated
independence rules in its Code of Professional Ethics. A decade later, independence was
recognized as one of the ten “generally accepted auditing standards,” a designation that it has

less than 100 registrants in total (out of more than 15,000 total SEC registrants), are not members of the SECPS
(SECPS Annual Report, Year Ended June 30, 1997, and telephone conversation with SECPS staff).
16 Public Oversight Board, 1997-98 Annual Report, p. 2.
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retained ever since.17 The current version of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct
includes a requirement that auditors be independent, and numerous interpretations of that
requirement have been issued.

27.
The AICPA’s quality control standards also require each auditing firm to design and
implement policies and procedures related to independence that are appropriate for the firm’s
practice, based on factors such as its size and the nature and complexity of the services it
offers to clients. Those standards specify that “policies and procedures should be established
to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that personnel maintain independence (in fact
and in appearance) in all required circumstances.”18 Firms also are required to communicate
their independence policies and procedures to appropriate firm personnel and to monitor
compliance with them.19 Implementation of the quality control standards, including those
related to independence, is tested during the triennial peer reviews required by the SECPS
membership rules.20

Factors Affecting Auditor Independence
28.
This subsection describes various factors that may affect auditor independence,
including factors that motivate auditors and auditing firms to maintain their independence.

Economic Motivations for Maintaining Auditor Independence

29.
It has been argued that auditors who behave rationally will endeavor to perform quality
audits because of economic incentives, namely, the firms’ stake in their reputational capital
and their interest in avoiding the costs of malpractice suits.21 Auditing firms, their owners,
and others who work in those firms thus share an interest in maintaining the firm’s
reputational capital. High-quality auditing and its effects on a firm’s reputation help the firm
attract and retain audit clients. Auditee managements and directors also are interested in
retaining auditors with high reputational capital because doing so adds credibility to auditees’
financial statements and reduces their cost of capital.

17 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures (AU Section
150).
18 Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 2, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm’s Accounting and
Auditing Practice (New York: AICPA, 1996), para. 9.
19 Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 2, para. 23; Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 3,
Monitoring a CPA Firm’s Accounting and Auditing Practice (New York: AICPA, 1996).
20 AICPA, SECPS, Peer Review Program Manual, “Quality Control Policies and Procedures and Membership
Requirements Questionnaire” (New York: AICPA, 1997), section 13242.
21 See, for example, The Law & Economics Consulting Group, Inc., “An Economic Analysis of Auditor
Independence for a Multi-Client, Multi-Service Public Accounting Firm,” in AICPA, Serving the Public
Interest: A New Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence [White Paper], (New York: AICPA, 1997),
Appendix B.
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30.
Controls to help ensure auditor independence help protect against the rogue behavior
of “free riders”—individual auditors who pursue their own short-term interests that are at
odds with the interests of the auditing firm. Those controls are based, in part, on the premise
that it is in each individual auditor’s and each auditing firm’s best interests to comply with
professional standards, including those related to auditor independence, that help ensure
quality audits.

Economics of Auditing Firms

31.
Financial statement audits performed by auditing firms in the private sector have
always had both commercial and professional aspects. Notwithstanding that, Congress
mandated that audits of SEC registrants be performed by independent auditors in the private
sector, rather than by government auditors. There has been no significant interest in replacing
the current system by, for example, moving the auditing of registrants into the public sector.
32.
Private-sector auditing comes under the aegis of the federal rules against restraint of
trade. In 1989, the Federal Trade Commission and the AICPA entered into a consent decree
that allowed auditing firms to advertise and to accept, from other than audit and certain other
clients, commissions, contingent fees, and referral fees. All of these had been banned
previously by the AICPA’s ethics code. In its 1978 report, the Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities noted the “excessive competition” in the accounting profession at that time.22
Many observers believe that the level of competition among providers of auditing services has
increased substantially since then.23

33.
Over the past several decades, the mix of services offered by many auditing firms has
changed dramatically. Previously, firms provided primarily audit and tax services. Their
consulting practices were relatively small, concentrating on accounting and other services that
CPAs were uniquely qualified to provide. Many firms now have consulting practices that
rival their audit and tax practices in revenues and profits.24 In addition, the tax and consulting

22 Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations (New York:
AICPA, 1978), p. 110.
23 Considerable research has been conducted that examines the competitiveness of the market for audit services.
Empirical work on three important elements of that market—audit fees, auditor concentration, and auditor
choice—is summarized in James A. Yardley, N. Leroy Kaufman, Timothy D. Cairney, and W. David Albrecht,
“Supplier Behavior in the U.S. Audit Market,” Journal of Accounting Literature (Vol. 11, 1992), pp. 151-84.
24 For example, Public Accounting Report conducts an annual survey of the largest U.S. auditing firms
(“national firms”). Data from those surveys show that those firms generated, on average, 46% of their U.S.
revenues in the 1998 fiscal year from “management consulting services” and 30.5% from “accounting and
auditing services” (Public Accounting Report [Special Supplement, February 28, 1999], p. 1). Previous years’
surveys showed that the percentage of total revenues derived from management consulting services has grown
steadily at these firms throughout the 1990s—revenues from such activities were only 27% of those firms’ total
revenues in the 1992 fiscal year (Public Accounting Report [May 31, 1997]). A similar trend was reported for
the 100 largest U.S. auditing firms, although, on average, revenues from management advisory services represent
a smaller percentage of those firms’ total revenues (16% in fiscal 1998) than they do for national firms (46% in
the same period) (Public Accounting Report [August 31, 1999]). These trends, and their potential impact on
auditor independence, are discussed by Ralph S. Saul, “What Ails the Accounting Profession?” Accounting
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practices of many large firms now derive a substantial portion of their revenues from non
audit clients, which loosens the bonds that traditionally tied audit, tax, and consulting
practices and personnel together.
34.
Concerns about the potential pressures on auditor independence created by the rapid
growth in consulting and other non-audit services have been discussed widely in the auditing
literature. For example, the AICPA’s Special Committee on Financial Reporting (Jenkins
Committee) noted that users of financial statements “are concerned that auditors may accept
audit engagements at marginal profits to obtain more profitable consulting engagements.
Those arrangements could motivate auditors to reduce the amount of audit work and to be
reluctant to irritate [auditee] management to protect the consulting relationship.”25

35.
The SEC has shared that concern, and in 1978 issued a rule requiring registrants to
disclose in their proxy statements information about non-audit services provided by
registrants’ external auditors.26 The requirement was later removed, however, because the
SEC did not believe that the information was sufficiently useful to investors.27
36.
There also have been changes in many auditing firms’ infrastructures and personnel
over the past few decades. Previously, firms had relatively small and decentralized
infrastructures, even when the firms themselves grew quite large. Professionals began in a
firm’s audit practice directly from undergraduate accounting programs, rose through the audit
ranks or transferred to the tax or consulting practices if their interests and abilities so
indicated, and either left the firm or became partners. Today, a higher proportion of
professionals entering accounting firms have work experience, bring more diverse skills and
expertise, and typically are hired into the specialty area in which they intend to practice.
These circumstances may make creating and maintaining a firm-wide culture more difficult.

37.
Furthermore, computerized systems for processing routine transactions and
calculations have reduced the frequency of random clerical errors in the records underlying
most auditees’ financial statements. Such systems permit auditing firms to use computer
auditing techniques to perform what used to be time-consuming, labor-intensive auditing
procedures. Many firms also have “reengineered” their audit processes to include more
focused risk-assessment activities, better deployment of their resources toward areas of high
audit risk, and increased audit efficiency. These changes have reduced the need for junior-level
professional staff. Turnover among professionals is high, however, and difficulty in attracting
Horizons (June 1996), pp. 131-37, and Michael H. Sutton, “Auditor Independence: The Challenge of Fact and
Appearance,” Accounting Horizons (March 1997), pp. 86-91.
25 AICPA, Special Committee on Financial Reporting, Meeting the Information Needs of Investors and
Creditors (New York: AICPA, 1994), p. 104.
26 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 250 (June 20, 1978).
27 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 304 (January 28, 1982). Research performed subsequent to the
requirement failed to show any significant stakeholder reaction to this information or any significant change
in the amount or types of non-audit services provided. See James H. Scheiner, “An Empirical Assessment
of the Impact of SEC Nonaudit Service Disclosure Requirements on Independent Auditors and Their
Clients,” Journal ofAccounting Research (Autumn 1984), pp. 789-97, and G. William Glezen and James
A. Millar, “An Empirical Investigation of Stockholder Reaction to Disclosures Required by ASR No. 250,”
Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1985), pp. 859-70.
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and retaining qualified personnel often is identified as a major challenge facing the auditing
profession.

38.
The partner and manager-level personnel assigned to an audit are typically responsible
for the engagement’s profitability. They usually negotiate a fee with auditee management that
is subject to change only in the event of unanticipated cost overruns beyond the auditor’s
control. Billing for audit engagements based on actual time and expenses, once the norm, is
now the exception.
39.
A common measure of engagement profitability is the realization rate—the percentage
of amounts charged to an engagement (based on actual hours and standard billing rates) that
actually is billed to the auditee. Some firms also measure performance by using a utilization
rate—the percentage of total time each professional charges to an engagement. Managers and
partners sometimes are evaluated based on both their own utilization rate and the rates of the
staff assigned to them.
40.
Managers and partners also may be evaluated according to the number of engagement
hours or total engagement fees under their management, the amount of other services they sell
(or are involved in selling), the number of new audit clients they acquire, and their clients’
promptness in paying fees. Firms also consider qualitative factors, such as professional
competence and experience in a targeted industry, when evaluating performance. The use of a
variety of factors to measure performance is intended to provide a balanced approach to
meeting a firm’s objectives.

Implications for Firm Cultures and Auditors’ Personal Attributes
41.
The question that arises in noting these changes is whether they alter the nature of the
factors that affect auditor independence and the impact of those factors on audit quality.28

42.
Auditing firms spend significant amounts on advertising and marketing, and many firms
attempt to differentiate themselves by finding and marketing niches in particular lines of
business or practice specialties. Others emphasize personal service, the expertise the firm can
provide, the firm’s ability to solve business problems, or an audit process that also measures
business efficiency and benchmarks the auditee’s operations to those of competitors. These
“branding efforts” are directed at auditee management—the group that effectively hires
auditors and consultants—but large sums also are spent on reinforcing these marketing
strategies and branding slogans within the auditing firm so that firm professionals can
implement the strategies and internalize a firm culture that may stress auditee satisfaction at
the expense of audit quality.

28 Research has been conducted that examines the impact of various types of pressures on accountants’ and
auditors’ attitudes and behavior. That research is summarized in F. Todd DeZoort and Alan T. Lord, “A
Review and Synthesis of Pressure Effects Research in Accounting,” Journal ofAccounting Literature (Vol. 16,
1997), pp. 28-85.
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43.
Concerns have been expressed that, as a result of competition among firms and their
marketing efforts, auditee managements may come to be viewed primarily as “customers” that
need to be pleased, with auditor’ responsibilities to users and other stakeholders
inappropriately deemphasized. Auditee managements also may sense an auditing firm’s desire
to please its “customers.” Some firms send periodic surveys to auditee managements asking
for feedback on whether the engagement team met or exceeded auditee management’s
expectations and provided satisfactory service. Auditing firm management also may meet
with auditee management to assess “customer” satisfaction. Negative feedback may lead to
meetings among the engagement partner, the dissatisfied auditee management, and auditing firm
management. In this environment, auditee management may believe that it has the upper hand,
and auditors may feel undue pressure to appease auditee management when there is an
accounting dispute. A requirement to report disagreements to the SEC when an auditing firm
is replaced29 can discourage changing auditing firms, but it does not eliminate the risk of
intimidation or retaliation by management against an engagement partner or other professionals
associated with the audit.

44.
Because auditing firms and the profession have recognized the pressures that auditors
in the field work under, they have established infrastructures and controls to help auditors
apply the appropriate personal attributes that are necessary to help ensure quality audits.
For example, a second partner must concur with important judgments and decisions made on
audits of public entities, and consultation mechanisms within firms assist engagement partners
in assessing complex auditing, accounting, and reporting issues. In addition, engagement
personnel frequently consult informally with other firm professionals as a check on their
conclusions. These informal networks of advisors and the formal firm decision-making
process support engagement personnel when they are in conflict with auditee management. In
some cases, auditing firm management, that is, partners who have no direct responsibility for
the relationship with the auditee, may participate in determining the firm’s position in such a
conflict. The intent and the effect are to make the decisions firm matters rather than decisions
of an individual partner, thereby relieving pressures on the engagement team.
45.
Other firm policies and procedures also may serve as signals to partners and staff of
the firm’s commitment to quality audits. For example, many firms make significant, ongoing
investments in their audit practice—updating audit methodologies and providing state-of-theart hardware and software that enable auditors to work effectively in a computerized
environment, have easy access to authoritative accounting and auditing literature and related
firm publications, and share resources and knowledge. Firms also have developed or acquired
expertise in specific industries and disciplines, providing engagement teams with a level of
knowledge and experience appropriate for performing quality audits in a complex business
environment.
46.
Much of this support of audit quality represents an effort to increase auditor
competence, which can help strengthen auditor independence. It also serves to balance the

29 SEC Regulation S-K Item 304 (a) and the related instructions to Item 304 (a).
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firm’s emphasis on its marketing and profitability objectives. Significant investments in
technology and expertise may provide compelling evidence of a firm’s commitment to the
audit practice. This should help foster a culture where the auditor is confident that the firm
encourages individuals to maintain the profession’s values—including auditor
independence—as well as to achieve the firm’s business objectives.

Pressures Arising from Auditors’ Professional Responsibilities
47.
In many professional-client relationships (for example, those that exist between
physicians and their patients or between attorneys and their clients), each party is involved in
decision making. Nevertheless, the two parties usually are not considered equals, in part
because of the professional's specialized knowledge and experience. Clients typically must
rely on the advice of professionals before a final decision is made (for example, about a
specific medical treatment or line of legal defense). Because clients usually do not have the
competence to evaluate the professional’s work and advice, professionals have a special
responsibility to their clients—often called “loyalty” —to ensure that clients’ trust in the
professionals and reliance on them are justified. In order for the shared decision-making
process to work effectively, clients must trust professionals to act in the clients’ best
interests, subject to the limits placed on the professionals because of their responsibilities to
other individuals and groups (for example, to other clients), to their profession (for example,
as specified in the Code of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association30[AMA] or
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association31 [ABA]), and to
the public at large (for example, to comply with applicable laws and regulations).

48.
An auditor's professional responsibility for loyalty is quite different from the
responsibility of loyalty to a client described above because of the auditor’s duty to serve the
public interest. A better analogy may be to a judge’s professional responsibility for ethical
conduct—to serve the public interest in resolving legal disputes. To meet their professional
responsibilities, judges are required to “uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary” and to “perform the duties ofjudicial office impartially and diligently.”32 Judges’
decisions should rest on their competence and diligence, that is, on their knowledge of
applicable laws, regulations, and precedents and their ability to apply that knowledge
properly in a specific case. In addition, judges are required to act without bias or prejudice
toward individuals or groups. Judicial decisions should not be affected by the potential
agreement or disagreement of specific individuals or groups, or by judges’ personal interests in
a specific outcome. As described in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct:
A judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the
judge’s judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the prestige ofjudicial
office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey

30 Code of Medical Ethics (Chicago: AMA, 1996).
31 Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 3rd ed. (Chicago: ABA, 1996).
32 Code of Judicial Conduct (Chicago: ABA, 1990), Canons 1 and 3.
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or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.33

A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in
the performance ofjudicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice,
including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit
staff, court officials and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.34

49.
Like those of judges, auditors’ professional responsibilities require that they base their
decisions on competent and unbiased assessments, free from pressures from individuals or
groups that may have a personal interest in specific decisions and free from any emotional,
financial, and other self-interests that may be served by a specific decision.35 The AICPA
Code of Professional Conduct summarizes those responsibilities as follows:
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibilities to the public.
The accounting profession’s public consists of clients, credit grantors, governments,
employers, investors, the business and financial community, and others who rely on
the objectivity and integrity of certified public accountants to maintain the orderly
functioning of commerce. This reliance imposes a public interest responsibility on
certified public accountants. The public interest is defined as the collective well-being
of the community of people and institutions the profession serves.
In discharging their professional responsibility, members may encounter conflicting
pressures from among each of those groups. In resolving those conflicts, members
should act with integrity, guided by the precept that when members fulfill their
responsibility to the public, clients’ and employers’ interests are best served.36
50.
Because of the environment in which they work, however, auditors are subject to some
pressures that judges do not face. Judges are elected by the public or are appointed by elected
representatives of the public to whom they are ultimately responsible. Although judges may
stand for reelection or reappointment, those decisions are made by the public or its
representatives. Judges do not have clients who pay their salaries, nor are they retained or
reappointed by individual clients. Although responsible to serve the public interest, auditors
may be affected by their firms’ interests in serving and retaining clients. The U.S. Supreme
33 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Section 2B.
34 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Section 3B(5).
35 Other professionals have responsibilities that are similar to those of auditors and judges. For example, the
International Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct of the Association for Investment
Management and Research (AIMR) defines investment professionals’ independence as follows: .. advice or
investment decisions which are the product of an investment professional’s own endeavors, and are not
influenced by or subject to the control of an issuer of securities, the management of the investment professional’s
employer, or any other outside sources” (September 1998, para. 1.6). Arbitrators in commercial disputes are
also expected to be independent: “An arbitrator should decide all matters justly, exercising independent
judgment, and should not permit outside pressure to affect the decision” (American Arbitration Association,
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes [1977], Canon V-B).
36 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, ET Section 53.01-.02.
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Court described an auditor’s professional responsibility and the importance of maintaining
independence in meeting that responsibility as follows:
... By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors
and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This “public watchdog” function
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times
and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.37

Role of Corporate Governance in Alleviating Pressures on Auditors

51.
The combination of various pressures on auditors and an audit environment in which
judgment is pervasive and evidence is merely persuasive can create an atmosphere in which
auditee management may attempt to influence an auditor’s judgments. Honest differences of
opinion between auditee managements and auditors on accounting matters (as well as among
auditee managements and among auditors) are to be expected, and there is nothing inherently
wrong with auditee management attempting to convince its auditor that a particular accounting
treatment is correct. Such attempts, however, may range from bringing relevant accounting
concepts and standards to the auditor’s attention to intimidating the auditor with threats of
harmful economic or other consequences unless the auditor accedes to management’s wishes.
The former is clearly acceptable; the latter is not, because it is an improper attempt to
pressure the auditor.
52.
Various aspects of corporate governance can assist auditors in resisting inappropriate
pressures from auditee managements, audit committees, and boards and in performing quality
audits. Among these are:

• an audit committee or board of directors that plays a major role in engaging the
auditing firm

• an audit committee or board of directors that accepts the responsibility to consider
management’s choice of accounting principles and estimates and, as part of that
consideration, to obtain the auditor’s views about the appropriateness of those
principles and estimates
• an auditee control environment (including the “tone at the top”) that emphasizes a
commitment to reliable financial reporting and creates an atmosphere in which all
auditee personnel understand that attempts to intimidate the auditor will not be
tolerated

37 U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co. [465 US 805 (1983), pp. 817-18, emphasis in original].
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53.
An effective audit committee can moderate management attempts to pressure auditors
into accepting inappropriate accounting treatments.38 It also can be a channel of
communication for the auditor to the full board, thereby helping to ensure that the auditor’s
positions are heard. Effective audit committees thus can serve as a safeguard to auditor
independence.39
54.
Auditors for some time have been required to report various sensitive accounting and
auditing matters to audit committees, thereby giving committees the opportunity to be
responsive to those matters.40 In 1999 the ISB issued Standard No. 1, which requires auditors
to report to and discuss with audit committees matters that may reasonably be thought to bear
on independence.41 Effective audit committees use those occasions to evaluate the auditors’
independence. To the extent that audit committees take on and meet responsibilities for
ensuring auditor independence through such evaluations, they also could serve as a safeguard
to auditor independence. These and other aspects of corporate governance can help to
discourage pressures on and intimidation of the auditor and also encourage the auditor to resist
them if they do arise.

38 Knapp studied a variety of factors that may impact an audit committee’s willingness to support the auditor
when disagreements arise with auditee management. See Michael C. Knapp, “An Empirical Study of Audit
Committee Support for Auditors Involved in Technical Disputes with Client Management,” Accounting Review
(July 1987), pp. 578-88.
39 Suggestions for strengthening the relationship between external auditors and auditees’ boards of directors and
audit committees were contained in the following reports: Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence,
Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent Auditor (Stamford, CT: Public Oversight Board, 1994),
pp. 12-23; U.S. General Accounting Office, The Accounting Profession—Major Issues: Progress and Concerns
(Washington, DC: GAO, 1996); Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (New York: New York Stock Exchange and National Association
of Securities Dealers, 1999).
40 Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees (AU Section 380).
Auditors’ other reporting obligations to audit committees cover matters pertaining to internal control, illegal
acts, and fraud.
41 ISB Standard No. 1, Independence Discussions with Audit Committees (New York: ISB, 1999).
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SECTION III —GOALS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
55.
This section discusses possible goals of auditor independence. That discussion is
preceded by consideration of personal attributes of individual auditors that many believe help
ensure quality audits.42 Different goals may lead to different definitions, concepts, and basic
principles of auditor independence.
56.

The basic question raised by this section is:

Question III-1: Which of the goals described in this section should form the
basis for the goal or goals of auditor independence to be included in a
conceptual framework? Please explain your views and discuss other goals that
should be considered.

Personal Auditor Attributes
57.
Certain personal attributes of auditors play an essential role in helping to ensure audit
quality. Judgments and decisions are made by all individuals on an audit team, and audit
quality can be maintained only if individual auditors at all levels within an auditing firm
possess appropriate personal attributes and exercise them when performing audits. For
example, the following personal attributes are discussed in the auditing literature:
• Competence—When applied to an auditor, competence means the ability to
develop an appropriate audit plan, select suitable auditing procedures to test
management’s assertions, execute the procedures and evaluate evidence, draw proper
conclusions regarding the conformity of the financial statements with GAAP, and
render the appropriate auditor’s report. To perform a quality audit, auditors need a
wide variety of technical and managerial knowledge and skills. Individual members of
an audit team will possess such knowledge and skills in varying degrees.

• Diligence—When applied to an auditor, diligence means approaching an audit
with professional skepticism, efficient and careful handling of technical matters, and a
willingness to devote adequate time and appropriate effort in performing an audit.
Diligence sometimes is included as part of an auditor’s responsibility to exercise due
professional care.
• Integrity—When applied to an auditor, integrity means being honest, trustworthy,
candid, and truthful in performing an audit and making judgments regarding the
financial statements’ conformity with GAAP. The AICPA Code of Professional
Conduct summarizes auditor integrity as follows:
42 Appendix B of this DM contains examples of various types of goals of auditor independence that have
appeared in the auditing literature in addition to those described in this section. Although that literature often
refers to the objectives of auditor independence, this DM uses the term goals in that context in order to avoid
confusion with the personal attribute of objectivity discussed in this section.
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Integrity is measured in terms of what is right and just. In the absence of specific
rules, standards, or guidance, or in the face of conflicting opinions, a member
should test decisions and deeds by asking: “Am I doing what a person of integrity
would do? Have I retained my integrity?” Integrity requires a member to observe
both the form and the spirit of technical and ethical standards; circumvention of
those standards constitutes subordination of judgment.43
• Objectivity—When applied to an auditor, objectivity means being impartial—that
is, having the ability to suppress any existing biases when obtaining and evaluating
audit evidence and making audit judgments. Biases may arise from an individual’s
background, education, and experiences and are part of human nature; therefore, it is
difficult for anyone to be completely objective. Biases can be both conscious and
subconscious and also can be either in favor of or against specific things—for example,
individuals, groups, organizations, ideas, or principles. Auditors must recognize that
personal prejudice—for example, bias for or against specific auditees or specific
accounting principles—can endanger the quality of audits by causing biased audit
judgments. As a result of the potential for bias, various controls (for example,
mandatory rotation of engagement partners, mandatory concurring partner reviews,
and other quality control policies and procedures) have been implemented to help
prevent potential biases from affecting the quality of audits.
58.
The above list, while not inclusive of all of the personal attributes that auditors should
have, illustrates the types of qualities that auditors need in order to perform quality audits.44
The mere possession of these attributes, however, is not sufficient to ensure a quality audit.
For example, an auditor who is competent might fail to exercise his or her competence in
making audit decisions in a specific circumstance. Accordingly, to perform a quality audit, an
auditor should not only possess appropriate personal attributes but also exercise them.
59.
To acknowledge the role that auditors’ personal attributes play in helping ensure
quality audits is not to suggest that the ISB’s purview includes all factors that could affect the
possession and exercise of an auditor’s personal attributes. The ISB’s mission is to develop
independence standards, not standards for competence, diligence, integrity, objectivity, or
other personal attributes. These personal attributes are described here because they are
components of some of the goals of auditor independence discussed later in this section. (A
formal definition of the term “independence” is not discussed until Section IV because of the
presumption that such a definition will depend on the goal or goals of independence.)

43 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct (as of June 1, 1998), ET Section 54.03.
44 One model that describes relationships between auditor independence and the personal attributes of objectivity,
integrity, and competence and how those attributes may affect audit quality is discussed in Robert K. Elliott and
Peter D. Jacobson, “In Search of Solutions—SEC Independence Concepts,” CPA Journal (April 1998), pp. 1819.
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Improving Financial Statement Reliability
60.
To help ensure that auditors possess and exercise appropriate personal attributes,
auditing firms have developed and implemented a wide variety of policies and procedures
(many of which are described in Section II). Firms’ hiring policies, training and continuing
professional education programs, and “tone at the top” stress the meaning and importance of
professionalism and the qualities that professional auditors should have. The attributes of
audit team members are assessed as part of the supervision of audits by a firm’s managers and
partners, including the various levels of reviews of an audit team’s work and periodic
performance reviews of individual auditors. In addition, peer reviews of auditing firms include
evaluations of the overall quality of audits performed by the firm, the work of individual
auditors, and the firm’s quality controls that are designed to ensure that its personnel have and
exercise appropriate personal attributes.

61.
Some believe that maintaining auditor independence is important because independence
helps ensure that an auditor can exercise appropriate personal attributes in performing an
audit. As a result, auditor independence helps ensure audit quality, thereby making it more
likely that an audit will enhance financial statement reliability. Under this view, a goal of
auditor independence could express the relationship among independence, an auditor’s
personal attributes, and improving financial statement reliability. For example:

Goal 1—A goal of auditor independence is to help ensure that auditors are
willing to exercise appropriate personal attributes when performing audits,
thereby making it more likely that audits will improve the reliability of
financial statements.
62.
It can be argued that Goal 1 is too broad because it includes all of an auditor’s personal
attributes. Some believe that independence is related more directly to the possession or
exercise of objectivity, integrity, or both than it is to other personal attributes, and a goal of
independence should reflect that closer relationship. For example, the International Federation
of Accountants (IFAC) recently issued a Discussion Draft containing revisions to its code of
ethics that states:
Independence requires the qualities of objectivity and integrity. Objectivity is the
intellectual quality of freedom from bias; integrity is the moral quality of honesty.45

63.
In its Statutory Audit Independence and Objectivity monograph, the Federation Des
Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) takes a somewhat different view:

The expression of an objective opinion should always be the ultimate goal of the
statutory audit. Independence is the main means by which the statutory auditor
demonstrates that he can perform his task in an objective manner.46

45 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (New York: IFAC, August 1999), para. 8.2.
46 (Brussels: FEE, July 1998), p. 8 (footnote omitted).
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64.
Goal 1 could be modified to emphasize the views that only objectivity, integrity, or
both are relevant personal attributes. For example, the phrase “willing to exercise appropriate
personal attributes” in Goal 1 could be replaced by the phrase “willing to exercise objectivity,”
“willing to exercise integrity,” or “willing to exercise objectivity and integrity.” (These
modifications also could be made to Goal 3 discussed later in this section.)
65.
Users of financial statements and other stakeholders outside the auditing firm cannot
practicably obtain information directly about auditors’ willingness to exercise appropriate
personal attributes when performing specific audits. Thus, they must rely on regulators,
standard setters, and auditing firms to identify activities and relationships with auditees that
can impair auditor independence. Those groups have concluded that auditors who do not
engage in such activities or enter into such relationships are more likely to be willing to
exercise appropriate personal attributes and, as a result, are more likely to perform quality
audits.
66.
An example illustrates how activities or relationships can indicate that an auditor’s
willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes might be threatened. Assume that an
auditor is assigned to an audit team for an auditee whose chief financial officer is the auditor’s
spouse. In this situation, the spouse’s interest in the audit’s outcome and the auditor’s
emotional attachment to his or her spouse significantly increase the likelihood that the auditor
has a personal interest in the audit’s outcome, which is a threat to auditor independence.
The absence of such a threat would improve the likelihood that the auditor will exercise the
appropriate personal attributes and perform a quality audit, which would improve financial
statement reliability.

67.
Goal 1 makes explicit the notion that auditor independence helps ensure that auditors
are willing to exercise appropriate personal attributes in performing audits. It can be argued,
however, that Goal 1 is inappropriate because there is no way to determine whether it has
been met. Under this view, a goal of auditor independence should be based on observable
indicators of an auditor’s potential unwillingness to exercise appropriate personal
attributes—the existence of activities or relationships that may impair auditor independence.
One example of a goal based on this view is as follows:
Goal 2—A goal of auditor independence is to help ensure that auditors do not
engage in activities or have relationships that make it less likely that audits
will improve the reliability of financial statements.

Enhancing Financial Statement Credibility and Stakeholder Confidence
68.
The goals of auditor independence discussed above are based on the assumption that
the value provided by a quality audit is improved financial statement reliability. Quality
audits also may add value by enhancing the credibility of financial statements. The Committee
on Basic Auditing Concepts of the American Accounting Association described the
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importance of enhanced credibility of, and users’ confidence in, financial statement
information as follows:

The audit function adds to the credibility of information because the user can ... be
more confident in using the information for its intended purposes than he would be if
the audit function had not been performed. This confidence allows the full potential
value of the accounting information to be realized—for that value is realized through
the use of the information, not its preparation and dissemination.47
69.
It can be argued that the enhanced credibility of financial statements and users’ and
other stakeholders’ confidence in financial statement reliability results, in part, from their
perceptions of reduced information risk that results from quality audits. For example,
research sponsored by the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities noted that
estimated risk is affected not only by actual errors but also by lack of confidence in
accounting data. By increasing confidence and reducing errors, auditing reduces the
associated cost of accounting information errors.48

70.
Although stakeholders’ perceptions of the reliability of financial statements may be
affected by many factors, it can be argued that an audit performed by auditors whom users
and other stakeholders believe are independent is an important source of enhanced financial
statement credibility and stakeholder confidence. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, “Public
faith in the reliability of a corporation’s [audited] financial statements depends upon the
public perception of the outside auditor as an independent professional.”49

71.
Several types of goals could be developed that express the interrelationships among
stakeholders’ perceptions, an auditor’s personal attributes, certain activities and relationships,
and auditor independence. For example, one goal could concern the relationship between
auditor independence and users’ and other stakeholders’ perceptions of an auditor’s personal
attributes.
Goal 3—A goal of auditor independence is to help ensure that users and other
stakeholders perceive that auditors are willing to exercise appropriate personal
attributes when performing audits, thereby making it more likely that audits
will enhance the credibility of financial statements.

72.
Another goal could be based on the relationship between auditor independence and
activities or relationships that may serve as observable indicators to stakeholders of an
auditor’s potential inability or unwillingness to exercise those attributes. For example:

47 American Accounting Association, Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts, A Statement of Basic Auditing
Concepts (Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association, 1973), p. 13.
48 Melvin F. Shakun, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Auditing, Research Study No. 3 (New York: Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities, 1978), p. 1.
49 U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co. [465 US 805 (1983), pp. 819-20, note 15].
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Goal 4—A goal of auditor independence is to help ensure that auditors do not
engage in activities or have relationships that may be perceived by users and
other stakeholders as making it less likely that audits will enhance the
reliability of financial statements.

73.
Various individuals and organizations, including some that were cited earlier in this
section, allude to increased confidence in the financial statements and their reliability as a
benefit of audits and of auditor independence. It can be argued that both enhanced financial
statement credibility and increased stakeholder confidence are separate benefits provided by
an auditor who is perceived by stakeholders as independent and that both benefits should be
included in the goals of auditor independence. For example, Goal 3 could be modified to
reflect this view by adding the phrase “and will improve users’ and other stakeholders’
confidence in the reliability of financial statements” at the end of the goal. Goal 4 also could
be modified in a similar manner.
74.
As described previously, users and other stakeholders ordinarily cannot ascertain the
identity of the individual members of the audit team assigned to a specific auditee, their
personal attributes, or their willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes when
performing an audit. As a result, it can be argued that users’ and other stakeholders’
perceptions of, and their confidence in, the improved financial statement reliability added by
an independent auditor may depend on their beliefs about the independence of auditors
generally and about the effectiveness of the totality of the self-regulatory and public
regulatory processes, including those concerning auditor independence, that help ensure audit
quality.50 The goals described in this subsection that explicitly mention stakeholders’
perceptions could be modified to emphasize this view by replacing the phrase “stakeholders
perceive that auditors are willing” with the phrase “stakeholders perceive that auditors as a
group are willing.”

Difficulties with Basing a Goal of Auditor Independence on Stakeholders’
Perceptions
75.
There is widespread agreement that audits performed by independent auditors enhance
financial statement credibility and stakeholder confidence in financial statement reliability.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that those benefits should not be included as separate goals of
auditor independence in a conceptual framework. Under this view, while financial statement
credibility and stakeholder confidence may be important to the capital markets, they are not
self-contained, separately deliverable benefits of an audit apart from improved reliability.
Generally accepted auditing standards do not require the auditor to undertake any auditing
procedures aimed at enhancing the financial statements’ credibility—a quality audit is aimed at
improving financial statement reliability. Enhanced credibility and improved stakeholder
confidence may be more likely to result from audits performed by independent auditors, but
50 Carmichael, for example, describes the importance of maintaining the public’s beliefs about the independence
of auditors as a professional group. See Douglas R. Carmichael, “In Search of Concepts of Auditor
Independence,” CPA Journal (May 1999), pp. 39-43.
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they are not goals that can be usefully distinguished from improved financial statement
reliability. Elliott and Jacobson describe this view as follows:

The auditor’s contribution is sometimes described as adding credibility to the capital
markets. Credibility is an important concomitant of auditing, but it is not the core of
the auditor’s contribution. The core contribution, to repeat, lies in the effects of the
audit process on the reliability of the information used for decisions. Without
improved reliability there would be no valid basis for investor confidence in the
information, and share prices would have less of a relationship to corporate earning
power. Auditors would indeed be cheerleaders for their clients if their purpose was
merely or chiefly to overcome the hesitations of investors to engage in transactions
because of possible management bias in the financial statements. The effect on the
capital markets would be limited to improving the willingness of capital suppliers to
enter transactions, with no effect on the relationship between share prices and the
substance of corporate operations and no effect on the likelihood of returns from
capital outlays.51
76.
The different views about the role of enhanced credibility and stakeholder confidence
typically center not on whether audits should be designed to enhance those factors but on
what the relationship is among improved reliability, enhanced credibility, and stakeholder
confidence in helping ensure effective resource-allocation decisions. The views of those who
believe that enhanced credibility and stakeholder confidence are conceptually separate from
improved reliability as goals of auditor independence were described in the preceding
subsection. Others believe that enhanced credibility and stakeholder confidence are not
separable from improved reliability as goals of auditor independence.
77.
Many who hold the latter view believe that, in the long run, financial statement
credibility and stakeholder confidence stem from the reliability of financial statements, not
from stakeholders’ perceptions that they are reliable. Unless financial statements are generally
reliable, stakeholders eventually will find that their confidence in financial statements is
misplaced. Financial statements that later are found to be unreliable, despite audits that
appeared to improve their reliability but failed to do so, cannot serve as a basis for effective
resource-allocation decisions. If audits do not improve the reliability of financial statements
generally, those who rely on audited financial statements to help make those decisions may
grow increasingly skeptical of the value of audits. Accordingly, those who hold this view
believe that improved financial statement reliability is the primary value provided by an audit
and that enhanced credibility is not separable from improved reliability in the long run because
enhanced credibility cannot long endure if reliability is not present. Under this view, goals of
auditor independence that concern financial statement credibility or stakeholder confidence are
not appropriate because they suggest that enhancing financial statement credibility or
improving stakeholder confidence is an important goal in its own right rather than the result of
increased financial statement reliability.
1 Robert T. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, “Audit Independence Concepts,” CPA Journal (December 1998), p.
32.
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78.
Another concern expressed by those who do not consider enhancing financial statement
credibility or improving stakeholder confidence as a separable goal of auditor independence is
the difficulty of deciding whose perceptions should be included when judging whether
credibility is enhanced or confidence is improved. As discussed in Section II, there are many
different groups of stakeholders in auditor independence. Different groups, and different
individuals within those groups, are likely to have different perceptions because such
perceptions are based on a wide variety of factors, including beliefs about the financial
reporting system, about auditing firms and the auditing profession, and about the systems of
public regulation and self-regulation.52 Accordingly, those who hold this view also may
believe that a goal of auditor independence based on stakeholders’ perceptions is
inappropriate because it is too difficult to judge when such a goal has been met.

****
79.
Goals 1 and 2 focus on auditor independence and its relationship to financial statement
reliability without including the notion that auditor independence may contribute to enhancing
stakeholders’ perceptions of financial statement reliability. As a result, these goals lead to
definitions, concepts, and basic principles of auditor independence that include the potential
effects on audit quality and on financial statement reliability of threats to auditor
independence but do not include stakeholders’ perceptions of those factors. Goals of auditor
independence that include enhanced financial statement credibility or increased stakeholder
confidence, such as Goals 3 and 4 and the related modifications, lead to definitions, concepts,
and basic principles of auditor independence that do include how users and other stakeholders
perceive factors related to auditor independence. Examples of both types of definitions,
concepts, and basic principles are discussed in Sections IV-VII.

52 The issue of whose perceptions should be considered by the ISB in developing standards of auditor
independence is discussed in Section VII.
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SECTION IV—DEFINING AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
80.
A definition derived from the goals of auditor independence would serve as a
fundamental building block on which other components of a conceptual framework could rest
and would provide stakeholders with a common language for discussion and debate. This
section discusses alternative definitions of auditor independence based on the goals described
in Section III.53

81.

The basic question raised by this section is:
Question IV-1: Which of the alternatives described in this section should form
the basis for a definition of auditor independence to be included in a conceptual
framework? Please explain your views and discuss other definitions or
approaches to defining auditor independence that should be considered.54

Definitions Based On Improving Financial Statement Reliability
82.
A definition of auditor independence based on the goal of improving financial statement
reliability could be based on various approaches, two of which are included in this DM. The
first—called the “personal attributes approach”—defines independence in terms of pressures
that could affect an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes. The
second—called the “activities and relationships approach”—defines independence in terms of
certain circumstances that might serve as observable external indicators of such pressure. This
subsection describes examples of formal definitions of auditor independence using each
approach.

Personal Attributes Approach

83.
It can be argued that independence is a desirable personal attribute—similar to the
attributes of competence, diligence, integrity, and objectivity discussed in Section III—that
auditors should have and exercise during an audit. A definition consistent with this view could
describe the personal attribute of independence and, based on Goal 1, would identify the role
of independence in helping to ensure a quality audit. For example:

Definition 1-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that
impair an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality audit.

53 Appendix C of this DM contains examples of different types of definitions of auditor independence that have
appeared in the auditing literature in addition to those described in this section.
54 In answering this question, some respondents may wish to comment on several of the specific alternatives
described in this section. A suggested format for structuring those comments can be found at the end of the
section.
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84.
It can be argued that Definition 1 is inadequate or incomplete because it does not make
clear that the pressures and other factors that may impair auditor independence are those that
may affect the auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes. It also can be
argued that independence is not a separable personal attribute but is a state of mind that helps
ensure that an auditor has the willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes when
performing an audit. A description of this view can be found in Mautz and Sharaf's The
Philosophy ofAuditing.
[One important phase of auditor independence] is the independence of approach and
attitude which any professional man should have if he is engaged in truly professional
work. This is a combination of self-reliance, freedom from client control, expert skill
and ability, and considered judgment based on training and experience not available to
those who are not members of the profession.55

85.
A definition of independence could describe the relationship between auditor
independence and an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes. For
example:

Definition 2-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that
impair an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes
when performing an audit.
86.
As discussed in Section III, it can be argued that independence is related more directly
to either objectivity, integrity, or both than it is to other personal attributes and that the
definition of independence should reflect that closer relationship. For example, the nowsuperseded AICPA Code of Professional Ethics defined independence as follows:

Independence has traditionally been defined by the profession as the ability to act with
integrity and objectivity.56
87.
A definition of independence that describes the relationship between the personal
attributes of objectivity and integrity and auditor independence could be expressed as follows:

Definition 3-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that
impair an auditor’s willingness to exercise objectivity and integrity when
performing an audit.
Similar definitions could be developed using either “objectivity” or “integrity” by itself instead
of both attributes together.

55 Robert K. Mautz and Hussein A. Sharaf, The Philosophy ofAuditing (American Accounting Association,
1961), pp. 230-31.
56 Restatement of the Code of Professional Ethics, p. 8.
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Activities and Relationships Approach
88.
Section III suggests that most stakeholders have no way to determine an individual
auditor’s integrity, objectivity, or other personal attributes or to assess when an auditor has
the willingness to exercise those attributes. Therefore, although Definitions 1, 2, and 3 may be
appropriate theoretical constructs for auditor independence, they may not be suitable for a
conceptual framework because they are vague about the sources of the pressures on an
auditor. In other words, they may not be as operational as they could be because they do not
include observable external indicators of factors that may affect an auditor’s willingness to
exercise appropriate personal attributes when performing an audit.
89.
This view is consistent with the notion that certain activities and relationships indicate
that an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality audit (i.e., exercise appropriate personal
attributes) may be impaired. Rule 2-01 of the SEC's Regulation S-X is consistent with that
view and states, in part:

(b) The Commission will not recognize any certified public accountant or public
accountant as independent who is not in fact independent. For example, an accountant
will be considered not independent with respect to any person or any of its parents,
its subsidiaries, or other affiliates (1) in which, during the period of his professional
engagement to examine the financial statements being reported on or at the date of his
report, he, his firm, or a member of his firm had, or was committed to acquire, any
direct financial interest or any material indirect financial interest; (2) with which, during
the period of his professional engagement to examine the financial statements being
reported on, at the date of his report, or during the period covered by the financial
statements, he, his firm, or a member of his firm was connected as a promoter,
underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee....

(c) In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not independent with respect
to a particular person, the Commission will give appropriate consideration to all
relevant circumstances, including evidence bearing on all relationships between the
accountant and that person or any affiliate thereof, and will not confine itself to the
relationships existing in connection with the filing of reports with the Commission.57
90.
Underlying this approach to defining auditor independence is the assumption that
auditors who are free of certain activities and relationships are presumed to be more willing to
exercise appropriate personal attributes and perform an audit that improves financial
statement reliability. The following definitions of auditor independence are based on an
activities and relationships approach. They modify Definitions 1, 2, and 3 by replacing the
phrase “freedom from pressures and other factors” with the phrase “the absence of certain
activities and relationships” and the addition of the word “may.” These modifications reflect

57 SEC Regulation S-X, Section 210.2-01.
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this approach’s focus on observable external indicators of circumstances in which auditor
independence might be impaired.
Definition 4—Independence is the absence of certain activities and
relationships that may impair an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality
audit.
Definition 5—Independence is the absence of certain activities and
relationships that may impair an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate
personal attributes when performing an audit.
Definition 6—Independence is the absence of certain activities and
relationships that may impair an auditor’s willingness to exercise objectivity
and integrity when performing an audit.58

Definitions That Include Stakeholders’ Perceptions
91.
The definitions in the previous subsection do not include stakeholders’ perceptions of
factors related to auditor independence.59 As discussed in Section III, however, it can be
argued that the goals of auditor independence also include enhancing financial statement
credibility and improving stakeholder confidence. Because these two goals are based on
stakeholders’ perceptions, a definition of auditor independence that is consistent with those
goals could include explicitly stakeholders’ perceptions of factors related to auditor
independence.60 One way to do that is to modify the wording of Definitions 1, 2, and 3.
Definitions 7, 8, and 9 illustrate a “personal attributes” approach that includes stakeholders’
perceptions.
Definition 7—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that
impair, or are perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality
audit.

Definition 8-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that
impair, or are perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to exercise
appropriate personal attributes when performing an audit.

58 This definition could be modified in the same ways suggested previously for Definition 3.
59 Because of the wide variety of stakeholders in auditor independence, it is likely that different perceptions of
auditor independence will exist. The definitions in this section do not suggest which stakeholder groups should
be considered when perceptions are being discussed. The basic principle described in Section VII deals with that
question.
60 An alternative method for including stakeholders’ perceptions in a conceptual framework is to adopt a
definition of auditor independence that excludes stakeholders’ perceptions but to include a basic principle that
describes the need for standard setters and others to consider such perceptions, as well as improved financial
statement credibility and stakeholders’ confidence in financial statement reliability, in the process of developing
auditor independence standards. This alternative is discussed in Section V.
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Definition 9-—Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors that
impair, or are perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to exercise
objectivity and integrity when performing an audit.

92.
Some may believe that Definitions 7, 8, and 9 are appropriate theoretical constructs,
but an operational definition for purposes of a conceptual framework should include activities
and relationships that indicate an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality audit. Definitions
10, 11, and 12 illustrate an “activities and relationships” approach that includes stakeholders’
perceptions.
Definition 10—Independence is the absence of certain activities and
relationships that may impair, or may be perceived to impair, an auditor’s
willingness to perform a quality audit.
Definition 11—Independence is the absence of certain activities and
relationships that may impair, or may be perceived to impair, an auditor’s
willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes when performing an
audit.
Definition 12—Independence is the absence of certain activities and
relationships that may impair, or may be perceived to impair, an auditor’s
willingness to exercise objectivity and integrity when performing an audit.61

93.
As discussed in Section III, it can be argued that enhanced financial statement
credibility and increased stakeholder confidence are based on stakeholders’ perceptions of
auditors as a group. That relationship could be included in any of the preceding definitions
that include stakeholders’ perceptions by changing the phrase “an auditor’s willingness” to
“the willingness of auditors as a group.”
* * * *

94.
The goals in Section III and the alternative definitions discussed in this section can be
used to derive various concepts and basic principles of auditor independence. Sections V-VII
discuss those elements of a conceptual framework.

61 As noted previously, definitions that include both “objectivity” and “integrity” could be modified to
accommodate the views that (a) only “objectivity” or “integrity,” by itself, is the appropriate personal attribute
in this context and (b) independence relates to the possession of one or both of these attributes, rather than the
willingness to exercise them.
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For respondents:
95.
The following definition illustrates how the alternatives described in this section could
be combined.
Independence is freedom from pressures and other factors—indicated by certain
activities or relationships—that may impair, or may be perceived to impair, the
willingness of auditors, both individually and as a group, to exercise appropriate
personal attributes (including objectivity and integrity) when performing an
audit.

96.
The chart below lists each element of the definition in paragraph 95. Do you believe
that a definition of auditor independence should include reference to those elements? Use the
chart in formulating your response to Question IV-1 if you believe it would be helpful.

Yes/No______ Comments
Freedom from pressures and other factors

Absence of certain activities or relationships

An auditor’s willingness to exercise
appropriate personal attributes

Willingness of auditors as a group to
exercise appropriate personal attributes
Perceptions of auditors’ willingness to
exercise appropriate personal attributes
Auditor objectivity
Auditor integrity
Other elements (please describe):
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SECTION V—AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE CONCEPTS
97.
The definitions of independence in Section IV assume that certain factors—referred to
as threats to auditor independence—may have a negative effect on auditor behavior. The
possibility that a negative effect will result suggests the existence of risk—referred to as
independence risk—that a threat may impair auditor independence. One or more
controls—referred to as safeguards to auditor independence—could be instituted, however, to
reduce independence risk. This section discusses the concepts of independence risk, threats,
safeguards, the significance of threats, and the effectiveness of safeguards. It also considers
whether stakeholder perceptions and benefits and costs of auditor independence should be
included as concepts of auditor independence.
98.

The basic question raised by this section is:

Question V-1: Do you believe that the concepts discussed in this section
—independence risk, threats to auditor independence and their significance,
safeguards to auditor independence and their effectiveness, stakeholders’
perceptions in independence considerations, and benefits and costs of auditor
independence—are useful and should be included in a conceptual framework?
What other concepts, if any, would be useful? Please explain your views.

Addressing Auditor Independence Issues
99.
Many factors in the audit environment help to ensure quality audits. Some apply to
individual auditors (such as timely participation in continuing professional education
programs), others concern auditing firms (such as implementing effective systems of quality
control), and others are part of the systems of public regulation and self-regulation of the
auditing profession (such as mandatory peer reviews of auditing firms).
100. Pressures on auditors and other factors can have a negative effect on audit quality.
Some are common to many professions, others arise because of the unique professional
environment in which auditors work, and still others may affect an individual auditor in one or
more specific circumstances. Those factors, however, do not necessarily affect audit quality,
in part because various controls have been developed by auditing firms and public regulatory
and self-regulatory bodies.

101. Furthermore, many of the factors that negatively affect audit quality are not directly
related to auditor independence. For example, some auditees are now using complex financial
instruments to manage risks. Auditors unfamiliar with those instruments and the required
accounting may not detect related accounting errors. Although factors such as these may have
a significant impact on audit quality, they do not involve independence issues. The ISB and
other stakeholders must, therefore, address two questions, either explicitly or implicitly, when
they consider various factors that could affect audit quality.
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• Do the issues under consideration relate to an auditor’s independence (as opposed
to other factors that could affect audit quality)?

•

If so, what is the likelihood that an auditor’s independence is impaired?

102. The rest of this section discusses an approach to addressing these questions using
various concepts of auditor independence.

Independence Risk
103. Independence risk can be thought of as the risk that, in a particular circumstance, an
auditor’s independence may be impaired. A more precise definition of independence risk
depends on the definition of independence adopted in the conceptual framework. Each of the
definitions discussed in Section IV could serve as the basis for a more precise definition of
independence risk. For example:

• Independence risk is the risk that pressures and other factors impair an auditor’s
willingness to perform a quality audit. (consistent with Definition 1 of auditor
independence in Section IV—personal attributes approach)

• Independence risk is the risk that an activity or relationship may impair an
auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes when performing an
audit, (consistent with Definition 5—activities and relationships approach)

104. Independence risk is increased when new factors are introduced that could impair
auditor independence. Those factors are defined in this DM as threats to auditor
independence. Independence risk is reduced when controls—including prohibitions,
restrictions, disclosures, and other policies and procedures, working singly or in
combination—mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence. Those controls—defined
in this DM as safeguards to auditor independence—exist in the environment in which audits
are performed or are put in place by regulators, standard setters, or firms in response to
threats to auditor independence.
105. Threats to auditor independence arise from numerous and diverse pressures, activities,
and relationships, and they may emerge in a wide variety of circumstances. Because they may
increase independence risk and lower the quality of audits, threats need to be analyzed
carefully.
106. Identifying and classifying the types of threats posed in specific circumstances and the
types of safeguards in place may help the ISB and other stakeholders better understand the
independence risk that those circumstances may pose. Classifying threats and safeguards also
may provide a common language for the ISB and other stakeholders to use in discussing
specific independence issues. It also may assist the ISB in developing a general approach to
analyzing independence risk that could help ensure an internally consistent set of
independence standards.
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Significance of Threats and Effectiveness of Safeguards
107. Assessing independence risk requires analyzing the significance (or strength) of threats
to auditor independence posed by a given set of circumstances and the effectiveness of the
safeguards that are, or could be put, in place to mitigate or eliminate a particular threat.
Because of the large number of potential threats and safeguards that are not susceptible to
quantification, this DM employs the general terms “significance of threats” and “effectiveness
of safeguards,” rather than “materiality,” which is more frequently associated with
quantitative measures or guidelines. Some threats and safeguards are susceptible to
quantification, however, and the ISB may determine that their significance and effectiveness
can be evaluated, in whole or in part, by reference to numeric benchmarks.

108. The significance of a threat in a particular set of circumstances is a function of many
factors. A particular threat could have vastly different effects on independence risk depending
on such factors as the force with which pressure is exerted, the stature of the person exerting
the pressure, the stature of the auditor who is being pressured, the strength of the auditor’s
integrity, and the importance of the matter that is the subject of the pressure'. The
effectiveness of a safeguard depends on whether it is suitably designed to meet its objective,
how it is applied, the consistency with which it is applied, by whom it is applied, and to
whom it is applied.62
109. Independence may be viewed as a quality or a condition that an auditor has in varying
degrees ranging from being “clearly independent” to being “clearly not independent.” Under
that view, the level of independence risk can be thought of as a position on a continuum that
ranges from “no risk of impaired independence” to “certainty of impaired independence.”63
The following definitions of significance and effectiveness in an independence context are
consistent with this view:

A threat to independence is significant if the threat increases independence risk to an
unacceptably high level (i.e., the likelihood of impaired independence is too high).

62 These are the same factors that are described in AU Section 319, Consideration of Internal Control in a
Financial Statement Audit, as determinants of the effectiveness of the design and operation of internal control
generally; safeguards are one type of control.
63 It also can be argued that independence is not a quality or a condition that an auditor has in varying degrees
but, instead, is something that an auditor either has or does not have. Under that view, only two levels of
independence risk exist—it is either acceptable (i.e., the auditor is independent) or unacceptable (i.e., the auditor
is not independent). Unlike an observable condition, however, an auditor’s independence cannot be directly
observed by others. As a result, judgment must be relied on to assess whether an auditor is, or is likely to be,
independent in a specific situation. The judgments of different individuals are likely to result in varying levels of
beliefs about auditor independence, the level of independence risk created in various circumstances, and the
acceptability of that level of independence risk. These two views on the nature of independence, therefore, may
be functionally equivalent—in both cases, independence risk can best be thought of as positions on a continuum.
This DM avoids the terms “unacceptable” or “acceptable” when referring to levels of independence risk because
those terms imply that independence risk can be described only as one of two alternative levels rather than as
consisting of points along a continuum. Respondents to the DM are encouraged to comment on whether they
agree with the appropriateness of this decision.
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A safeguard to independence is effective if the safeguard reduces independence risk to
an acceptably low level (i.e., the likelihood of impaired independence is sufficiently
low).

110. These definitions of significance and effectiveness imply the need to judge, for a given
set of circumstances, where along the independence risk continuum the level of independence
risk becomes unacceptably high. That point will be a matter ofjudgment for the individual or
group that is assessing independence risk in a specific situation.

Stakeholders’ Perceptions in Independence Considerations
111. Different views concerning the desirability of including stakeholders’ perceptions in
the goals and definition of auditor independence are discussed in Sections III and IV. If
stakeholders’ perceptions are included in those goals or definition, the ISB will need to
consider a third question, in addition to the two discussed previously in this section, when it
addresses auditor independence issues:

• What is the likelihood that stakeholders would perceive that an auditor’s
independence is impaired?
112. Two approaches can be used to address this question. The first would be to include
stakeholders’ perceptions in the definition of the term “auditor independence.” Because the
definition of independence risk is based on the definition of independence, this approach also
would result in including stakeholders’ perceptions in assessments of independence risk.
Those assessments would, as a result, be based on both the likelihood that an auditor’s
independence may be impaired and the likelihood that stakeholders would perceive that
independence may be impaired. The following examples illustrate how some of the definitions
of auditor independence in Section IV (i.e., those that include stakeholders’
perceptions—Definitions 7-12) could serve as the basis for a definition of independence risk
that included stakeholders’ perceptions (the italicized words are additions to the definitions of
independence risk discussed previously). If the ISB were to assess independence risk using
one of these definitions, it would need to consider stakeholders’ perceptions of auditor
independence in the specific circumstances under consideration in addition to (a) the existence
and significance of the threats posed in specific circumstances and (b) the existence and
effectiveness of safeguards that eliminate or mitigate those threats.

• Independence risk is the risk that pressures and other factors impair, or are
perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to perform a quality audit, (consistent
with Definition 7 of auditor independence in Section IV—personal attributes
approach)
• Independence risk is the risk that an activity or relationship may impair, or may be
perceived to impair, an auditor’s willingness to exercise appropriate personal attributes
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when performing an audit, (consistent with Definition 11—activities and relationships
approach)
113. A second way for the ISB to consider stakeholders’ perceptions when examining
auditor independence issues is to adopt a definition of independence (and therefore a definition
of independence risk) in the conceptual framework that does not include stakeholders’
perceptions but to include those perceptions when the acceptability of the level of
independence risk is assessed. Section VII discusses such an approach.

Benefits and Costs of Auditor Independence
114. There are benefits and costs of auditor independence to many of the various
stakeholders in auditor independence.64 Consideration of those benefits and costs may be
relevant when the ISB and others evaluate the level of independence risk.

Benefits of Auditor Independence

115. The benefits of auditor independence can be expressed in terms of helping to ensure
quality audits and financial statement reliability, lowering the cost of capital to auditees by
reducing the premium that investors and creditors demand as compensation for assuming
information risk, and increasing the effectiveness of the capital markets in allocating resources.
Maintaining auditor independence also may help reduce litigation and related costs to auditees
and auditors resulting from alleged and actual situations involving unreliable financial
statements. Independence also may enhance the reputational capital of individual auditors,
auditing firms, and the auditing profession as a whole—an important factor in maintaining the
confidence of stakeholders in auditor independence. Individuals and auditing firms with
reputations for high-quality audits may be able to “leverage” those reputations and help the
firms retain existing clients, attract new clients, and charge higher fees.

Costs of Auditor Independence
116. Costs of auditor independence include costs of developing, applying, maintaining,
monitoring, and enforcing safeguards. Those costs include the costs to auditees and other
stakeholders associated with various safeguards—for example, the cost of foregone economies
of scope when firms are proscribed from providing certain types of services to auditees and
the potential reduction in audit efficiency resulting from the rotation of audit partners. There

64 Benefits and costs to society generally are sometimes referred to as social benefits and costs; benefits and costs
to specific individuals, groups, or organizations—such as auditors, auditing firms, and the auditing
profession—are referred to as private benefits and costs. This distinction, however, is difficult to draw in the case
of auditor independence because some private benefits and costs may be diffused throughout society, thereby
becoming social costs and benefits. This DM, therefore, does not attempt to categorize benefits and costs of
auditor independence as social or private.
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are also costs associated with the system of public regulation and self-regulation of auditor
independence—for example, the expenses incurred by state and federal regulators and
standard-setting bodies, much of which is underwritten, directly or indirectly, by auditing
firms. Other costs of auditor independence relate to the costs incurred by individual auditors
and auditing firms associated with administering and complying with independence rules and
regulations. In addition, income may be lost by individual auditors (and their families) and by
auditing firms as a result of prohibitions against or restrictions on various activities and
relationships imposed by standard setters, regulators, or auditing firms. There also may be
costs related to reductions in audit quality that may result if less competent individuals are
attracted to the profession because of independence rules—for example, if restrictions against
auditors’ investments in auditees reduce the pool of high quality entry-level individuals.

Measuring Benefits and Costs
117. The benefits of auditor independence in the form of more effective resource-allocation
decisions and auditees’ reduced cost of capital are not easily measured. Benefits that may be
reaped by auditors in the form of reduced litigation and enhanced reputational capital are also
difficult to quantify.

118. Some of the costs of auditor independence may be measurable—for example, the costs
of maintaining and monitoring independence rules and policies and costs related to the
operations of professional associations, standard setters, and oversight bodies. These costs
may be measured by the amounts expended by auditing firms and by bodies responsible for
regulating auditors, but allocating those amounts to issues involving independence or to
specific safeguards to auditor independence is a difficult, if not impossible, task. The costs
related to foregone economies of scope and reduced audit quality also are extremely difficult to
measure.
119. Clearly, judgment, rather than precise measurement, will need to be used if the ISB and
others include costs and benefits when they consider issues of auditor independence. In fact,
the difficulties of identifying and measuring the relevant benefits and costs may suggest to
some that the ISB should not attempt to do so. Section VI discusses a basic principle
concerning the role that benefits and costs could play when the ISB develops independence
standards.
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SECTION VI —BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE:
ANALYZING THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS
120. This section examines basic principles related to threats and safeguards that can be
used to analyze the independence of auditors in a wide variety of circumstances and can serve
as guidelines for the ISB when it develops standards for auditor independence. Section VII
discusses an additional basic principle dealing with how the ISB could include stakeholders’
perceptions in its standard-setting process.
121.

The basic questions raised by this section are:
Question VI-1: Do you believe that the principles described in this section will
be useful to the ISB in developing future standards? Please explain your views
and discuss other types of guidance that you believe would make the conceptual
framework more useful to the ISB or to other stakeholders.
Question VI-2: Do you believe that it is useful to analyze threats based on their
nature and significance? Please explain your views and discuss types of threats
other than those identified in this section that should be considered in a
conceptual framework for auditor independence.
Question VI-3: Do you believe that it is useful to analyze safeguards based on
their type and effectiveness? Please explain your views and discuss types of
safeguards other than those identified in this section that should be considered
in a conceptual framework for auditor independence.

Question VI-4: Do you believe that the ISB should consider which individuals
in an auditing firm (as well as the firm itself) are affected by one or more
threats to auditor independence in the specific circumstances under
consideration and by one or more safeguards that effectively mitigate or
eliminate those threats? Please explain your views.
Question VI-5: Do you believe that the ISB should weigh the costs of alternative
safeguards against the benefits of reduced independence risk resulting from
those safeguards when it develops new independence standards? Why or why
not? Please discuss your views about how the ISB should measure the costs and
benefits of alternative safeguards.

Threats to Auditor Independence
122. The first step in analyzing the independence of auditors, based on the concepts
described in Section V, involves identifying potential threats to auditor independence that arise
in specific circumstances. Identifying potential threats is important because threats represent
sources of independence risk—that is, they increase the likelihood that an auditor’s
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independence may be impaired. Two basic principles of auditor independence related to the
identification and analysis of threats are described below.

Threat Identification
123. Considerable research has addressed the circumstances that represent potential sources
of threats to auditor independence. Researchers have considered many environmental and
situational variables—such as the nature of the relationship between auditors and auditees, the
types and extent of non-audit services provided to auditees, the size of fees for both audit and
non-audit services, the existence and nature of available authoritative guidance pertaining to
accounting issues, and the systems by which auditing firms compensate and promote their
employees.65
124. Researchers also have studied the effects on auditor independence of various pressures
and other factors. This research considers the processes by which auditors’ judgments are
formed and decisions are made and the variables related to auditor independence that may
influence those judgments and decisions. These studies have found that an auditor’s ability to
maintain his or her independence in specific circumstances is based on the interactions among
different types of variables, including:

• auditors’ personal attributes and beliefs, such as their integrity and their level of
ethical development

• cultural characteristics of the auditing firm in which auditors work, which stem, in
part, from firm leadership
• contextual variables that depend on the specific circumstances faced by an auditor
that may affect the relative “bargaining power” of an auditor and an auditee—for
example, economic factors such as the financial health of the auditee, the size of the
audit fee, and the existence and size of fees for non-audit services
125. The results of this research suggest that the judgments and decisions of auditors, when
faced with potential threats to their independence, are likely to be affected by a wide variety

65 Some of the research on auditor independence has involved developing analytical models that examine
theoretical relationships between auditor independence and various factors, such as audit pricing and non-audit
services. The predictions of some of these models have been examined in subsequent studies to test whether the
hypothesized relationships affect auditors’ judgments and decisions. A summary of those models and related
empirical research can be found in Gary Kleinman, Dan Palmon, and Asokan Anandarajan, “Auditor
Independence: A Synthesis of Theory and Empirical Research,” in Gary J. Previts, Thomas R. Robinson, and
Nandani Chandar (Eds.), Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 12 (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1998), pp. 342.
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of pressures and other factors, and different auditors are likely to react to a specific set of
circumstances in different ways.66

126. Regulatory bodies in the United States, including the SEC and the AICPA, as well as
organizations outside the United States, have developed independence rules and
interpretations concerning specific circumstances that they believe may create threats to
auditor independence—for example:
• financial interests between an auditor and an auditee—such as financial
investments, loans, joint ventures, and unpaid fees
• services provided to an auditee deemed incompatible with an auditor’s role—such
as bookkeeping and related professional services
• business relationships with an auditee—such as acting as an officer, director,
underwriter, broker/dealer, or trustee
•

personal or family relationships with an auditee

•

actual or threatened litigation between an auditor and an auditee

127. Threats to auditor independence created in the kinds of circumstances described above
can be classified based on the general nature of the threats—for example:
• Self-interest threat—a threat that arises from an auditor acting in his or her own
interest.67 Self-interests include an auditor’s emotional, financial, or other personal
interests. An auditor may favor, consciously or subconsciously, those self-interests
over his or her interest in performing a quality audit. For example, auditors’
66 Carolyn A. Windsor and Neal M. Ashkanasy, “The Effect of Client Management Bargaining Power, Moral
Reasoning Development, and Belief in a Just World on Auditor Independence,” Accounting, Organizations and
Society (Vol. 21, 1995), pp. 701-20.
This type of threat is similar to an information processing bias identified in the behavioral science literature as
67
the “self-serving bias.” People do not process information perfectly, and one common imperfection is the
tendency to prefer outcomes that serve an individual’s own self-interests. Bazerman, Morgan, and Lowenstein
summarize research in this area and suggest that the bias is a result of people’s tendency to view information and
arguments that support their own self-interests as being more persuasive than those supporting other positions.
This bias in interpreting evidence in favor of a position that supports an individual’s self-interests may limit an
auditor’s ability to gather and interpret audit evidence objectively. The authors suggest that even for an auditor
with a high degree of integrity, this inherent self-serving bias, and thus self-interest threat, is likely to remain an.
issue in connection with auditor independence (Max H. Bazerman, Kimberly P. Morgan, and George F.
Lowenstein, “The Impossibility of Auditor Independence,” Sloan Management Review [Summer 1997], pp. 8994). Burke, however, argues that auditors’ self-serving bias actually helps support auditor independence. He
suggests that this occurs because of the “positive consequences” if auditors maintain their independence (such as
performing quality audits, which result in their receiving rewards from their firms) and the “negative
consequences” of their not doing so (such as losing their jobs or harming their firms) (W. Warner Burke,
“Auditor Independence: An Organizational Psychology Perspective,” in AICPA, Serving the Public Interest: A
New Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence [White Paper] (New York: AICPA, 1997), Appendix C,
p. 9).
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relationships with auditees create a financial self-interest because auditees pay the fees,
both for audit and for any non-audit services performed for them. An auditor also
would have a financial self-interest if he or she owned stock in an auditee or an
emotional self-interest if an employment relationship existed between the auditor’s
spouse and an auditee. Various types of safeguards may mitigate or eliminate self
interest threats, such as prohibitions against certain financial interests and family
relationships between auditors and auditees, restrictions on the percentage of total firm
fees earned from one auditee, and auditing firm disclosures to audit committees of fees
for audit and non-audit services.

• Self-review threat—a threat that arises from an auditor reviewing his or her own
work or the work done by others in the auditor’s firm. It is more difficult to evaluate
without bias one’s own work, or that of one’s firm, than the work of someone else or
of some other firm. Therefore, a self-review threat exists when an auditor reviews
judgments and decisions made by the auditor or by the auditor’s firm. Safeguards that
may mitigate or eliminate self-review threats include concurring partner and peer
reviews, firewalls, and prohibitions against auditors acting in the capacity of auditee
management.

• Advocacy threat—a threat that arises from an auditor acting as an advocate for or
against an auditee’s position or opinion rather than as an unbiased attestor. An
advocacy threat is present, for example, if an auditor acts as an underwriter or
broker/dealer for an auditee’s securities. An advocacy threat also may be present if an
auditor takes a position against an auditee, such as in litigation between an auditee and
an auditing firm. Safeguards that may mitigate or eliminate advocacy threats include
prohibitions against and limitations on auditors providing certain non-audit services for
auditees that involve advocacy roles.
• Familiarity (or trust) threat—a threat that arises from an auditor being influenced
by a close relationship with an auditee. A familiarity threat is present if an auditor is
not sufficiently skeptical of an auditee’s assertions and, as a result, too readily adopts
an auditee’s viewpoint because of his or her familiarity with or trust in the auditee.
For example, a familiarity threat may exist when an auditor has a particularly close or
long-standing personal or professional relationship with an auditee. Safeguards that
may mitigate or eliminate familiarity threats include mandatory rotation of engagement
partners and restrictions on certain employment relationships between auditors’
family members and auditees.
• Intimidation threat—a threat that arises from an auditor being inappropriately
pressured by an auditee or by another interested party. Various pressures faced by
auditors are described in Section II; many of those pressures are present in all audits
and do not represent intimidation unless the pressures become too severe.
Nevertheless, intimidation threats may arise, overtly or covertly, in a variety of
situations where disagreements occur between an auditor and a member of an auditee’s
management—for example, disagreements over the auditee’s application of an
accounting principle. This threat also may arise if individuals higher up in an auditor’s
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firm pressure the auditor to accede to the position of an auditee’s management in that
or in similar situations. Safeguards that may mitigate or eliminate intimidation threats
include concurring partner reviews, internal consultation requirements, and an
appropriate “tone at the top” in both auditing firms and auditees.
128. Different types of threats may arise in one set of circumstances. For example, if an
auditor’s relative is a member of auditee management and the auditor works on that auditee’s
engagement, three types of threats may be present:

• Self-interest—the auditor’s personal relationship with his or her family member
may create an emotional or financial self-interest in the outcome of the audit.

• Advocacy—the auditor may show partiality toward the work of the family
member, which may impair the auditor’s ability to serve as an unbiased attestor of the
auditee’s financial statements.
• Familiarity (or trust)—the auditor’s personal relationship with the family member
may make it difficult for the auditor to maintain professional skepticism.

129. Although different methods of classifying threats could be developed, the
classifications used above are based on the systems in use and under development by standard
setters in various places outside the United States, including the United Kingdom (the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [ICAEW]), in Europe (the
Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens [FEE]), and internationally (the International
Federation of Accountants [IFAC]).68 Some respondents to this DM may believe that
modifications to these classifications are desirable or that a different system should be
considered by the ISB in developing its conceptual framework. When commenting on this
DM, those respondents are encouraged to describe those modifications or an alternative
classification system and the advantages the modifications or alternative system provides.
130. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the need to classify threats that
may arise in various circumstances. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:

Basic Principle 1—Different types of threats to auditor independence
—including self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity (or trust), and
intimidation—arise in different circumstances.

68 These are called “threats to objectivity” by ICAEW and FEE. See ICAEW, Guidance for Members in
Practice (London: ICAEW, 1996), Section 1.201, and FEE, Statutory Audit Independence and Objectivity
(Brussels: FEE, July 1998), p. 9. IFAC describes four classifications of “risks” or threats to independence; it
combines the familiarity and intimidation classifications into one category, labeled “client influence.” (See
IFAC, Discussion Draft, “Independence,” proposed revision to Code of Ethics of Professional Accountants
[New York: IFAC, August 1999], Part B, paras. 8.6-8.22.) Threats to auditor independence and objectivity also
are discussed in the guidelines for social and ethical audits developed by the Institute of Social and Ethical
AccountAbility (ISEA) (Exposure Draft, AccountAbility 1000 Framework [London: ISEA, November 1999], p.
38).

45

Significance of Threats
131. The significance of a threat depends on factors such as its force, the stature of the
persons involved, the nature of the matter causing the threat, and the strength of the auditor’s
integrity. All of those factors need to be evaluated in the context of the specific circumstances
in which the threat arises. Some of the factors may be quantifiable; others may not be. For
example, the extent to which an auditor’s financial interest in an auditee creates a threat to the
auditor’s independence may depend, in part, on the value of the interest relative to the
auditor’s net worth (which is quantifiable) and on the degree of “directness” of the interest
(e.g., a direct investment in an auditee’s equity securities contrasted with an indirect
investment through a mutual fund that invests in the equity securities of many entities), which
is not quantifiable. A threat can be considered significant if, considering all of its quantitative
and qualitative aspects, it increases the level of independence risk to an unacceptably high
level.
132. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the relative significance of threats
to auditor independence. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:

Basic Principle 2—The significance of threats created in specific circumstances
affects the level of independence risk.

Safeguards to Auditor Independence
133. The process of analyzing the independence of auditors includes identifying and
assessing the effectiveness of safeguards that are in place that may mitigate or eliminate the
threat or threats posed in specific circumstances. Two basic principles related to safeguard
identification and analysis are discussed below.

Safeguard Identification
134. As described in Section V, safeguards work either singly or in combination to mitigate
or eliminate one or more threats to auditor independence, thereby reducing the level of
independence risk. Different safeguards may mitigate or eliminate different types and levels of
significance of threats,69 and one safeguard may mitigate or eliminate several threats. Some
safeguards are quantifiable (e.g., a policy regarding the maximum percentage of total fees that
an auditing firm can derive from one auditee); others are not (e.g., a prohibition against an
auditor undertaking a specific activity or having a family member with a specific employment

69 Burke discusses various types of safeguards to auditor independence from an organizational psychology
perspective. He considers factors that motivate auditors to maintain their independence, including specific
safeguards that are internal to an individual auditor and those that are external. See W. Warner Burke, “Auditor
Independence: An Organizational Psychology Perspective,” in AICPA, Serving the Public Interest: A New
Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence [White Paper] (New York: AICPA, 1997), Appendix C.
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relationship with an auditee). Some safeguards are preventive in nature (e.g., an orientation
program for newly hired auditors that emphasizes the importance of independence); others are
related to threats arising in specific circumstances (e.g., prohibitions against certain
employment relationships between auditors’ family members and auditees); still others are
designed to deter violations of other safeguards by increasing the likelihood that they will be
discovered (e.g., reviews of auditors’ securities portfolios to detect prohibited investments).

135. Some safeguards reside in the environment in which audits are performed as part of the
systems that help ensure overall audit quality—for example, the activities and requirements of
the various bodies involved in public regulation and self-regulation of the auditing profession.
Those safeguards include regulatory actions by state boards of accountancy, the SEC and
other regulatory bodies, and the legal liability faced by auditors and other participants in the
capital markets. Other elements in the present environment related to safeguarding auditor
independence include the following:
• the importance of the reputations of auditing firms and individual auditors and the
importance of independence in maintaining those reputations
• peer review programs that assess firm-wide compliance with professional
standards and regulatory requirements regarding independence

• general oversight by auditees’ audit committees and boards of directors concerning
compliance with the regulatory requirement that an auditee’s financial statements be
audited by auditors who are independent
• other aspects of corporate governance, including an auditee’s “tone at the top,”
that support auditor independence

136. This group of safeguards also includes the wide variety of rules that are designed
specifically to help maintain auditor independence. For example, public regulatory bodies,
such as the SEC and state boards of accountancy, and self-regulatory bodies, such as the ISB
and AICPA, recognize that auditors face potential threats to their independence. In response,
those bodies have developed rules, standards, and codes of professional conduct that contain
various types of safeguards to auditor independence.
137. A second group of safeguards exists within auditing firms. Some are mandated by
regulators, and others are adopted voluntarily by the firms. These safeguards are part of an
auditing firm’s quality control policies and procedures70 and include policies and procedures
related to auditee acceptance and retention, the rotation of engagement management, concurring
partner reviews, requirements for internal consultation on technical issues, and maintaining a

70 Auditing firms are required by AICPA quality control standards to develop and implement effective internal
policies and procedures that provide “reasonable assurance” that firm personnel are independent. Those
responsibilities are described in AICPA Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 2 (QC Section 20.09).
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“tone at the top” in the auditing firm that stresses the importance of auditor independence.71
Other safeguards in auditing firms include policies and procedures related specifically to
independence, such as a policy prohibiting investments in any auditee by any auditor or other
professional employee of the auditing firm, and personnel hiring, training, promotion, and
retention policies that emphasize the importance of auditor independence, the potential
threats raised in various circumstances that auditors in the firm may face, and specific
safeguards in place to mitigate or eliminate those threats.

138. Some have suggested that additional safeguards entailing structural changes in the
environment should be developed. Those suggestions include having auditors employed by a
governmental agency rather than by auditing firms; requiring government appointment of
auditors; requiring mandatory rotation of auditing firms; having auditors retained for multi
year, instead of annual, periods; permitting auditees to change auditing firms only for cause;
and prohibiting auditing firms from performing all management advisory services for auditees.
139. One way to classify safeguards related specifically to auditor independence is based on
the extent to which activities and relationships are restricted. Under this method, one type of
safeguard provides for absolute prohibition of an activity or relationship—for example,
prohibiting auditors from having any direct financial investment in any auditees. Another
type of safeguard permits the activity or relationship, but restricts its extent or form—for
example, a restriction that auditors cannot have material indirect financial interests in auditees.
A third type of safeguard permits the activity or relationship, but requires other policies and
procedures to address the threat—for example, the mandatory rotation of an engagement
partner after he or she has spent a certain period of time on a specific audit engagement. A
fourth type of safeguard permits an activity or relationship but requires the auditor to disclose
information about it to the auditee’s management, audit committee, board, or others—for
example, disclosure to an auditee’s audit committee of non-audit services provided by the
auditor to the auditee.

140. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the need to identify different types
of safeguards. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:

Basic Principle 3—Different types of safeguards—including prohibitions,
restrictions, other policies and procedures, and disclosures—can mitigate or
eliminate threats to auditor independence.

71 Researchers have suggested that an ethical “tone at the top” can be established in various ways. For example,
when members of senior management in an auditing firm serve as role models by behaving ethically, they send
clearer signals to subordinates that the firm expects that kind of behavior from all who work in the firm. Another
method that helps establish an ethical “tone at the top” is for the auditing firm to adopt a code of ethics and
related policies and procedures that help ensure that the code is communicated and enforced. See Don W. Finn,
Lawrence B. Chonko, and Shelby D. Hunt, “Ethical Problems in Public Accounting: The View from the Top,”
Journal of Business Ethics (Vol. 7, 1988), pp. 605-15.
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Effectiveness of Safeguards
141. When analyzing safeguards, it is not sufficient to consider the types of safeguards that
are, or could be put, in place. Independence risk will not be reduced unless safeguards operate
effectively to mitigate or eliminate threats created in specific circumstances. The extent to
which they do so depends on their design, how they are applied, the consistency with which
they are applied, by whom they are applied, and to whom they are applied. A safeguard is
considered effective by itself or in combination with other safeguards if it reduces the level of
independence risk to an acceptably low level.

142. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the relative effectiveness of
alternative safeguards. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:

Basic Principle 4—The effectiveness of the design and operation of various
safeguards affects the level of independence risk.

Independence Risk and Auditor Independence
143. As discussed in Section V, the level of independence risk can be thought of as a
continuum. At one end of that continuum, there is “no risk of impaired independence.” At
the other end, there is “certainty of impaired independence.” Because they increase the level
of independence risk, threats to auditor independence move an auditor toward the “certainty
of impaired independence” end of the continuum. Safeguards to auditor independence may
mitigate or eliminate threats, thereby reducing the level of independence risk—that is, they
may move an auditor toward the “no risk of impaired independence” end of the continuum.
Identifying and analyzing the types and significance of threats and the types and effectiveness
of safeguards, as described in Basic Principles 1-4, allow standard setters to assess the level of
independence risk in specific circumstances.
144. A basic principle of auditor independence concerns the process of assessing
independence risk. Such a principle could be expressed as follows:

Basic Principle 5—The ISB should assess the level of independence risk by
considering the significance of the threats to auditor independence created by
specific circumstances and the effectiveness of the safeguards that mitigate or
eliminate those threats when it develops standards for auditor independence.
145. Section V notes that the level of independence risk—that is, its position on the
independence risk continuum—is not easily quantifiable (although respondents who believe
that quantification is desirable are encouraged to include in their comments a description of a
quantitative approach to independence risk assessments). Nevertheless, it can be argued that
segments of the independence risk continuum can be described in terms of the likelihood that
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independence is impaired. For example, three segments and two endpoints of the continuum
could be described as follows72:
•

No risk of impaired independence—auditor is clearly independent

•

Remote risk of impaired independence—impaired independence is very unlikely

•

Some risk of impaired independence—independence might be impaired

•

Probable risk of impaired independence—impaired independence is very likely

•

Certainty of impaired independence—auditor is clearly not independent

146. After analyzing both the threats to auditor independence created in specific
circumstances and the safeguards that mitigate or eliminate those threats, the level of
independence risk can be described as being in one of the segments, or at one of the endpoints,
on the independence risk continuum. The ISB then can determine whether that level is in a
segment or at the endpoint on the independence risk continuum that it considers to be
“acceptably low.” If it is not, the ISB can decide which additional safeguard, or combination
of safeguards, will reduce independence risk to an acceptably low level.
147. A basic principle of auditor independence that addresses the need to ensure that
independence risk is “acceptably low” could be expressed as follows:

Basic Principle 6—The ISB should determine whether, in the specific
circumstances under consideration, the level of independence risk is acceptably
low.
148. It can be argued that the only acceptably low level is at the “no risk of impaired
independence” endpoint of the independence risk continuum. Under this view, the goal of
ensuring financial statement reliability is too important for the ISB to allow any independence
risk—that is, any threats to auditor independence that are not fully eliminated by safeguards.
Some may believe that such a goal is appropriate in the face of the difficulties described above
in assessing both the level of independence risk and the effectiveness of various safeguards in
dealing with potential threats to auditor independence. Under this view, this is the only way
that the ISB can define an objective, ascertainable “bright line” for establishing an acceptably
low level of independence risk.
149. In order for independence risk to be at the “no risk of impaired independence”
endpoint of the continuum, effective safeguards would need to be in place to ensure that
independence risk resulting from any threats to auditor independence that arise in specific
circumstances is completely eliminated. It can be argued that a position at the “no risk of
72 This description of the segments on the independence risk continuum is adapted from the classifications used
in FASB Statement No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (Stamford, CT: FASB, 1975), para. 3.
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impaired independence” endpoint of the independence risk continuum is unrealistic,
unattainable, or too costly to achieve. Establishing that endpoint as a goal would, in effect,
mandate that the ISB prescribe safeguards that could provide “absolute assurance” of auditor
independence, a level of assurance that audits themselves are not designed to provide. It also
can be argued that safeguards rarely can be completely effective in eliminating all threats, or
that such a level of effectiveness can be achieved only at an excessive cost. Those who hold
this view may believe that individual auditors have different personal attributes and different
degrees of those attributes.73 Those who hold this view also may believe that the “no risk of
impaired independence” end of the independence risk continuum is best considered an
aspirational ideal, rather than something that can be achieved.

150. Those who hold this view also believe that the ISB will need to judge when the threats
to auditor independence that arise in specific circumstances are sufficiently mitigated by
existing or new safeguards so that independence risk is acceptably low—that is, in an area of
the continuum that is sufficiently close to the “no risk of impaired independence” endpoint.74
Under this view, accepting some level of independence risk is a practical necessity, but that
level should be sufficiently low to ensure that there is only a very small risk of impaired
independence.

151. Given the extent ofjudgment involved in determining independence risk in specific
circumstances and the importance of independence in ensuring audit quality and reliable
financial statements, the ISB could use as a guideline that only a very low level of
independence risk is acceptable—for example, one that falls in the “remote risk of impaired
independence” segment of the continuum. Under this view, such a low level might balance the
practical difficulties of eliminating all independence risk against the need to ensure that audits
provide increased financial statement reliability and that stakeholders have confidence in the
independence of auditors and in the reliability of audited financial statements.

Which Individuals Are Affected by Threats and Safeguards?
152. It can be argued that the ISB’s assessments of independence risk should include
consideration of which individuals in an auditing firm are subject to threats created in specific
circumstances and what safeguards concerning those individuals are, or could be put, in place.
Under this view, some threats concern only specific individuals within an auditing firm—for
73 Research has been conducted that considers what factors may influence individual auditors’ judgments
regarding their independence. For example, Sweeney and Roberts found that auditors at lower levels of moral
development were also more likely to rely solely on independence rules, rather than their own ethical beliefs,
when making judgments about independence. They also suggested that the “tone at the top” in an auditing firm
works together with an individual auditor’s level of moral development in determining an auditor’s reaction to
independence issues (John T. Sweeney and Robin W. Roberts, “Cognitive Moral Development and Auditor
Independence,” Accounting, Organizations, and Society [Vol. 22, 1997], pp. 337-52).
74 Such judgments also would need to be made by other individuals or organizations when they assess
independence risk—for example, auditing firms adopting independence policies, individual auditors making
decisions when faced with situations for which there is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy, auditees
and audit committees meeting their responsibilities to retain auditors who are independent, and regulators
meeting their statutory responsibilities.
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example, an employment relationship between a family member of a junior staff member on an
engagement team and an auditee may create a threat only for the junior staff member. Under
this view, safeguards that mitigate or eliminate a threat concern only those specific individuals
directly involved—in this case, only the junior staff member.

153. It can be argued, however, that a sense of collegiality often develops among individuals
in auditing firms, whether or not they work together on an audit engagement, and therefore
that a person’s judgment also might be influenced by relationships involving colleagues’
families. Consequently, those relationships also may pose a threat to auditor independence.
To mitigate or eliminate such threats, safeguards could apply to others in addition to the
specific individual or individuals directly involved in the audit. In the previous example,
instead of prohibiting only family relationships between the engagement team and the auditee,
the prohibition could be extended to include all individuals in an auditing firm who supervise
or otherwise are in a position to influence the design, performance, or outcome of the audit; to
all individuals in the firm who provide any type of service to the auditee; to all individuals
with a certain level of responsibility in the firm (e.g., partners); or to all individuals in the firm
without exception.
154. It also can be argued that different safeguards should be applied to different groups of
individuals within an auditing firm, depending on the significance of the threats posed. For
example, the most stringent safeguards (such as prohibitions) could be applied to those most
closely involved with the engagement, such as the members of the engagement team (and
perhaps including those in the auditing firm in a position to influence the audit). Less
stringent safeguards (such as required disclosure to the auditee’s audit committee) might be
adequate for others within the auditing firm for whom the threat is less significant because
they are less likely to be able to influence the audit. Those who hold this view also may
believe that some threats to auditor independence relate to the independence of the auditing
firm as a whole—for example, loans by an auditee to an auditing firm or financial investments
in an auditee by an auditing firm’s defined benefit pension plan. For these threats, it can be
argued that safeguards should apply to all professionals (or to some subset, such as all
partners) in an auditing firm and to the firm itself.
155. The need to consider the individuals affected by threats and safeguards could be
expressed in a basic principle as follows:
Basic Principle 7—The ISB should consider which individuals in an auditing
firm (as well as the firm itself) are affected by one or more threats to auditor
independence in the specific circumstances under consideration and whether
one or more safeguards effectively mitigate or eliminate those threats.
156. It can be argued, however, that the ISB should not be concerned with which individuals
in an auditing firm are affected by threats to auditor independence. Under this view, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to identify which specific individuals or groups of individuals in an
auditing firm face threats to auditor independence in specific circumstances. For example, in
circumstances in which an auditor’s relative is a member of auditee management, the ISB may
be unable to determine whether the threat posed by the employment relationship is limited to
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the individual engagement team member whose relative is employed by the auditee; the threat
to auditor independence may extend to all auditors located in any of the auditing firm’s offices
where firm personnel work on the engagement, or possibly to all auditors in the entire firm.
Under this view, it is difficult to design effective safeguards that apply to specific individuals
or groups within a firm that mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence because of
the difficulty in identifying which individuals in a firm face threats in specific circumstances
and the relative significance of the threats faced by those individuals. Those who hold this
view may believe that Basic Principle 7 offers no substantive guidance to the ISB. Instead, the
ISB should develop broadly applicable safeguards, including prohibitions, when it identifies
threats to auditor independence.

Benefit and Cost Considerations in Independence Standard Setting
157. As described in Section V, safeguards to auditor independence may have many types
of benefits and costs. It can be argued that the ISB should consider the costs of existing and
proposed safeguards and the benefits resulting from reduced independence risk. That would
require the ISB to assess not only the level of independence risk when it considers threats
posed in specific circumstances but also the costs of possible safeguards.
158. A basic principle concerning the need to consider costs and benefits could be expressed
as follows:
Basic Principle 8—The ISB should weigh the costs of alternative safeguards
against the benefits of reduced independence risk resulting from those
safeguards when it develops standards for auditor independence.
159. Section V describes some of the difficulties in identifying and measuring the benefits
and costs of safeguards. For this and other reasons, it can be argued that the ISB should ignore
costs and benefits in setting independence standards. Faced with a similar choice, the FASB
chose to do otherwise.

Despite the difficulties, the Board does not conclude that it should turn its back on the
matter, for there are some things it can do to safeguard the cost-effectiveness of its
standards. Before a decision is made to develop a standard, the Board needs to satisfy
itself that the matter to be ruled on represents a significant problem and that a standard
that is promulgated will not impose costs on the many for the benefit of a few. If the
proposal passes that first test, a second test may subsequently be useful. There are
usually alternative ways of handling an issue. Is one of them less costly and only
slightly less effective? Even if absolute magnitudes cannot be attached to costs and
benefits, a comparison between alternatives may yet be possible and useful.75
75 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative
Characteristics of Accounting Information (Stamford, CT: FASB, 1980), para. 143.
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160. The ISB often will be faced not only with a choice among different safeguards that vary
in terms of their cost and effectiveness but also with alternative ways of applying a particular
safeguard. In weighing the costs and benefits of alternative safeguards, the ISB need not
consider the dollar amount of costs and benefits of a particular safeguard, but rather only the
differential costs and benefits of that safeguard as compared with others. The latter may be
more susceptible to measurement than the former.
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SECTION VII —BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE:
CONSIDERING STAKEHOLDERS’ PERCEPTIONS
161. As part of its process of establishing independence standards, the ISB is committed to
seeking the views of the various stakeholders in auditor independence.76 Different stakeholder
groups and different individuals within a particular stakeholder group may have different
perceptions about auditors and about matters related to auditor independence. In addition,
there are different ways in which the ISB could include those perceptions in its standard
setting process. This section discusses factors that may affect perceptions of auditor
independence and describes how a basic principle of auditor independence might address the
role of perceptions in the ISB’s standard-setting process.
162.

The basic questions raised by this section are:

Question VII-1: Are there aspects of stakeholders’ perceptions other than those
discussed in this DM that are relevant to, and should be considered in, a
conceptual framework for auditor independence? If so, please describe them
and their relevance to auditor independence.

Question VII-2: Which of the alternatives described in this section, if any,
should form the basis for a basic principle related to consideration of
stakeholders’ perceptions to be included in a conceptual framework? Please
explain your views.
Question VII-3: Are there ways other than those noted in the alternative basic
principles described in this section by which the ISB could consider
stakeholders’ perceptions in its standard-setting process? If so, please describe
them.

Bases of Stakeholders’ Perceptions
163. The professional auditing literature has long recognized the importance of the public’s
views concerning the independence of auditors. For example, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 1 notes:

It is of utmost importance to the profession that the general public maintain confidence
in the independence of independent auditors. Public confidence would be impaired by

76 “The operating policies of the ISB ... are designed to permit timely, thorough, and open study of issues
involving auditor independence and to encourage broad public participation in the process of establishing and
improving independence standards. The objective of the ISB’s policy of openness and public participation is to
stimulate public consideration and debate on matters relating to its objective and mission. All of the ISB’s
constituencies, including members of the public, are encouraged to express their views on matters under
consideration in order to stimulate constructive public dialogue” (ISB, “Independence Standards Board
Operating Policies,” <www.cpaindependence.org>, Preamble).
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evidence that independence was actually lacking, and it might also be impaired by the
existence of circumstances which reasonable people might believe likely to influence
independence. To be independent, the auditor must be intellectually honest; to be
recognized as independent, he must be free from any obligation to or interest in the
client, its management, or its owners. ... Independent auditors should not only be
independent in fact; they should avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their
independence.77

164. The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct’s discussion about an auditor’s
professional responsibilities for maintaining independence includes a similar notion concerning
the “appearance” of independence:

For a member in public practice, the maintenance of objectivity and independence
requires a continuing assessment of client relationships and public responsibility. Such
a member who provides auditing and other attestation services should be independent
in fact and appearance.78

165. Many academic research studies have examined the perceptions of different groups of
stakeholders about matters related to auditor independence. Among the groups studied are
stockholders, creditors, financial analysts, auditors, auditee managements and board members,
and regulators. Those studies have looked at a wide variety of interests and relationships
between auditors and auditees that researchers felt might create the perception of a threat to
auditor independence. Researchers also have examined those groups’ beliefs about aspects of
the environment in which audits take place, including various characteristics of auditing firms
and auditees. The following are examples of the types of factors that have been studied:
•

the characteristics of auditing firms—such as their size and reputation

•

the characteristics of auditees—such as their financial condition and industry

• the characteristics of the relationship between auditing firms and auditees—such as
the number of years the auditor works on a specific audit engagement and the types
and extent of various auditor-auditee relationships

• environmental factors—such as the risk of legal liability and the level of
competition in the audit market
•

the types and extent of non-audit services provided to auditees

• the effectiveness of various safeguards to auditor independence—such as
concurring partner reviews

77 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures (AU Section
220.03, emphasis in original).
78 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, ET Section 55.03.
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166. The results of this research suggest that stakeholders’ knowledge about the
organizations, processes, and rules related to auditor independence is very limited.79 It also
suggests that, because of differences within and between stakeholder groups, the ISB may
have to decide whose perceptions should be considered and the weight those perceptions
should be given in the standard-setting process.

167. Stakeholders’ perceptions of auditor independence may be similar to perceptions in
other situations in which public opinion is based on beliefs about the effectiveness of
regulatory systems that help ensure the quality of goods and services, rather than on detailed
knowledge about the quality of the goods or services themselves. For example, airline
passengers do not ordinarily know, or have access to, the maintenance and inspection records
of an airplane before they board it. Instead, they may believe that relatively few safety
incidents occur and that it is safe to fly. This may reinforce passengers’ beliefs that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the regulatory agency that has responsibility for
ensuring airplane safety in the United States, has appropriately discharged its responsibility
by ensuring that regulations for airplane safety have been properly designed and are operating
effectively. Passengers also may believe that airplane manufacturers and airline companies
have satisfied their responsibilities for meeting safety regulations as well as their own
manufacturing and operating standards for the airplanes that they build and operate. When
safety problems with planes occur, public confidence in the industry and in the regulatory
system overseeing it is enhanced if people believe that follow-up investigations are handled
appropriately and that any changes in the regulations or processes necessary to ensure
passenger safety are successfully implemented. Members of the public also may believe that,
when necessary, recourse to the legal system is available to ensure that consumers will be
compensated for losses caused by responsible parties and that, when appropriate, criminal
sanctions will be imposed. This also may be thought to have a deterrent effect.
168. In a similar manner, it can be argued that most stakeholders in auditor independence
cannot identify the individual auditors assigned to a particular engagement or the attributes

79 In November 1999, the ISB published the results of a comprehensive series of interviews with various
stakeholders concerning their perceptions of issues related to auditor independence. The study indicated that
there were differences between and within various stakeholder groups (Earnscliffe Research & Communications,
“Report to the United States Independence Standards Board: Research into Perceptions of Auditor Independence
and Objectivity,” <www.cpaindependence.org>. Engle and Sincich studied the perceptions of a random sample
of auditors concerning a wide range of independence issues and also found differences in their beliefs (Terry J.
Engle and Terry L. Sincich, “The Loss of Auditor Independence: Perceptions of Staff Auditors, Audit Seniors,
and Audit Managers,” Research on Accounting Ethics [Vol. 4, 1998], pp. 167-84).
For a summary of many of the research findings on stakeholders’ perceptions, see Gary Kleinman, Dan
Palmon, and Asokan Anandarajan, “Auditor Independence: A Synthesis of Theory and Empirical Research,”
Research in Accounting Regulation (Vol. 12, 1998), pp. 3-42, and F.Todd DeZoort and Alan T. Lord, “A
Review and Synthesis of Pressure Effects Research in Accounting,” Journal ofAccounting Literature (Vol. 16,
1997), pp. 28-85. The authors note that the findings tend to be inconclusive or contradictory, in part because
different types of stakeholders and different individuals perceive the factors that create threats to auditor
independence quite differently. The authors also suggest that a variety of methodological problems, such as
modeling pressures on auditors in experimental research environments and biases that may exist in survey
research, make it difficult to interpret the findings.
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that those auditors may have and exercise during an audit. Nor are they aware of threats to
auditor independence that may increase independence risk on a specific audit engagement, the
safeguards that may mitigate or eliminate the threats on that engagement, or details of the rules
that help ensure auditor independence on all audit engagements. As a result, stakeholders’
perceptions about auditor independence may be based on their beliefs that the organizations,
processes, and rules that help ensure auditor independence generally are functioning
effectively.80 Those beliefs, in turn, may be influenced by the relatively few instances of
independence problems that are reported in the financial press or otherwise brought to the
public’s attention. When an independence problem does surface, stakeholders may believe
that the problem was caused by the actions of an individual, a firm, or an auditee and generally
can be resolved satisfactorily through the regulatory or legal system. If systemic problems are
found with the organizations, processes, or rules that help ensure auditor independence,
stakeholders also may believe that they will be addressed appropriately by standard setters or
regulators.

Incorporating Stakeholders’ Perceptions
169. Section III of this DM suggests that the goals of auditor independence could include
improving financial statement reliability and enhancing financial statement credibility and
stakeholder confidence in financial statement reliability. The ISB’s views about those goals
may affect how and to what extent stakeholders’ perceptions are incorporated in the
independence standard-setting process. The remainder of this section describes three views of
the role that stakeholders’ perceptions could play in the ISB’s standard-setting process. Each
of those views could lead to a basic principle of auditor independence that addresses how the
ISB should consider stakeholders’ perceptions in setting independence standards. Such a
principle could be expressed as one of the following:

Basic Principle 9A—The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders and
develop independence standards that reflect stakeholders’ perceptions.
Basic Principle 9B—The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders but
develop independence standards that reflect the likely perceptions of a
hypothetical group of stakeholders, namely, “reasonable, fully informed users
of financial statements.”

80 Mautz and Sharaf used the term “profession-independence” to describe
the image of auditors as a group brought to mind when the term “auditor” or CPA is used.... To
many people who have never had direct acquaintance with independent auditors, the term still has
meaning, a meaning which they have gained from what they have read, from the impression various
forms of mass communication media have made upon them, and from the ideas passed on to them
by various opinion leaders. There are many people who, although they know an individual auditor
and think highly of him, may well have quite another impression of the profession. When the time
comes for them to rely on the work of unknown auditors, it is their general impression that will
govern (The Philosophy of Auditing, p. 205).
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Basic Principle 9C—The ISB should solicit the views of all stakeholders and be
informed by stakeholders’ perceptions, but develop independence standards
based on the ISB’s judgment about how best to meet the goal or goals of auditor
independence.

Reflecting the Perceptions of Stakeholders
170. Reflecting the perceptions of stakeholders in auditor independence—the approach
described in Basic Principle 9A—is compatible with the belief that both improved financial
statement reliability and enhanced financial statement credibility and stakeholder confidence in
that reliability are appropriate goals of auditor independence. It is incompatible with the
belief that the only appropriate goal of auditor independence is improved financial statement
reliability. This alternative reflects the belief that a standard-setting process based on the
views of all, or at least a broad cross-section of, stakeholders is more likely to ensure
stakeholder confidence in the ISB, in its standard-setting process, and in the independence of
auditors.
171. To promulgate standards that reflect the perceptions of all, or at least a broad cross
section of, stakeholders, the ISB first would have to identify those perceptions. Information
about stakeholders’ perceptions could be gathered from many sources—including surveys,
focus groups, and other types of research; input from stakeholders who serve on ISB task
forces and other working groups; stakeholders’ responses to issues raised in ISB discussion
memoranda and exposure drafts; and stakeholders’ testimony at public hearings.
172. Because of the complexity of the issues and differences in knowledge and beliefs about
auditors and their independence, however, there are likely to be significant differences in
perceptions between and within stakeholder groups. The ISB would need to decide how to
incorporate those differing perceptions into its standard-setting process, in effect deciding
whether the perceptions of some stakeholders or stakeholder groups should be weighed more
heavily than the perceptions of other individuals or groups.

Reflecting the Perceptions of Reasonable, Fully Informed Users
173. An alternative view—expressed in Basic Principle 9B—is that the ISB should develop
independence standards that reflect the perceptions that a hypothetical group of stakeholders,
namely, “reasonable, fully informed users of financial statements,” would be likely to have.
Like the previous alternative, this view is compatible with the belief that both improved
financial statement reliability and enhanced financial statement credibility and stakeholder
confidence in that reliability are appropriate goals of auditor independence, and incompatible
with the belief that the only appropriate goal of auditor independence is improved financial
statement reliability.
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174. The “reasonable, fully informed user” concept has its roots in the “reasonable person”
and “reasonable investor” concepts that are currently in the auditor independence literature.
For example, the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct notes:

Members must be aware that it is impossible to enumerate all circumstances wherein
the appearance of a member’s independence might be questioned by third parties....
[M]embers must consider whether [a relationship or interest] ... would lead a
reasonable person aware of all the facts, who took into consideration normal strength
of character and normal behavior under such circumstances, to conclude that the
situation poses an unacceptable threat to the member’s objectivity and appearance of
independence.81
175.

The SEC describes that group of stakeholders in a similar way:

Pursuant to the Commission’s regulations, the basic test for auditor independence is
whether a reasonable investor, knowing all relevant facts and circumstances, would
perceive an auditor as having neither mutual nor conflicting interests with its audit
client and as exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues brought to the
auditor’s attention.82
176. The ISB can gain insights into what the perceptions of “reasonable, fully informed
users” would likely be from the various sources of stakeholders’ perceptions discussed
previously. If it uses this approach, the ISB will have to infer, from the input it receives, the
relevant views of a hypothetical group of reasonable, fully informed stakeholders concerning
the effectiveness of alternative safeguards in mitigating or eliminating threats to auditor
independence. Because it may be difficult to draw such inferences, however, some believe that
the ISB should not adopt an approach to standard setting requiring that its decisions reflect
the perceptions of even a limited class of stakeholders. Rather, the ISB should use its own
judgment to evaluate what new standards, if any, best meet the goal or goals of auditor
independence. That alternative view is described below.

Using Judgment Informed by Stakeholders’ Perceptions

177. As expressed in Basic Principle 9C, an alternative to the two views described
previously is that the ISB should be informed by stakeholders’ perceptions, but should not
base its decisions on those perceptions. Under this view, the ISB, rather than a group or
groups of stakeholders, is in the best position to judge the long-term impact of proposed
standards on the goal or goals of auditor independence, and its standard-setting process should
not prevent it from making those judgments, even if those judgments differ from those of

81 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, Interpretation 101-9 (ET Section 101.11).
82 SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 50, The Establishment and Improvement of Standards Related to
Auditor Independence (February 18, 1998), Section I (footnote omitted).
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stakeholders. Like the alternatives discussed in the previous two subsections, this alternative
is compatible with the belief that both improved financial statement reliability and enhanced
financial statement credibility and stakeholder confidence in that reliability are appropriate
goals of auditor independence.

178. The difference between this alternative and those discussed previously can be
illustrated by considering how the ISB might choose among alternative courses of action when
dealing with a specific issue. Using either of the two previous alternative approaches, the ISB
would necessarily reflect in its standards the perceptions of one or more stakeholder groups,
regardless of the views of the ISB members themselves. Under this alternative, the ISB would
not be bound by the views of any stakeholder group or groups—for example, the ISB might
issue a standard that mandates safeguards the ISB believes are necessary to help ensure
financial statement reliability, even if one or more stakeholder groups believe otherwise. The
ISB might believe, in this situation, that the benefits of the additional safeguards—expressed
as improved financial statement reliability or decreased independence risk—exceed their costs.
The ISB might conclude, in another situation, that additional safeguards are unnecessary
because it believes independence risk is sufficiently low without them, even if one or more
groups of stakeholders—for example, reasonable, fully informed users—believe that a
significant threat to auditor independence exists in those circumstances. In this situation, the
ISB might take the position that the costs of additional safeguards exceed the limited benefits
of enhanced financial statement credibility or stakeholder confidence that might result from
those additional safeguards. Although stakeholders’ perceptions would not serve as the basis
for the ISB’s conclusions, insights into those perceptions not only would inform its
consideration of the issues, but also might affect the way that it communicates its conclusions
and their rationale to stakeholders and, as a result, serve to improve stakeholders’
understanding of independence risk.
179. Some who believe that the alternative discussed in this subsection, or a variation
thereof, is the appropriate alternative for the ISB to embrace, point to the processes used to
establish rules by other bodies of experts, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and the FAA. Those bodies base their judgments about the need for new rules on all available
information—including the results of actual and simulated testing of safety and efficacy as
well as the public’s views about proposed rules—not simply on whether the public believes
that the new rules are needed. Members of the general public, in turn, rely on the system
(which includes the regulatory bodies responsible for setting and monitoring compliance with
those rules) when they buy food and medicine or board an airplane. The public relies on the
system because it believes that others with more expertise are in the best position to judge
what rules are necessary and to enforce those rules. The regulatory bodies have open lines of
communication with the public and typically receive extensive media coverage, thus affording
them opportunities to explain their proposed policies and the underlying rationale.

180. Those who hold this view may believe that the ISB’s standard-setting process should
work in the same way. That is, the ISB is in the best position to establish appropriate
standards, based on a thorough evaluation of all available information, including input from
stakeholders. Under this view, the ISB would neither ignore stakeholders’ perceptions nor
base its decisions only on those perceptions. Instead, the ISB would solicit the views of
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stakeholders and be informed by their perceptions by, for example, considering the potential
impact of its conclusions on financial statement credibility and stakeholders’ confidence, as
well as the potential impact on the reliability of financial statements.
181. This alternative is permissive with respect to the extent to which the ISB might
incorporate stakeholders’ perceptions in its standard-setting process. Under a variation of
this alternative, the ISB would adopt an independence standard only if it believed that the
standard would improve financial statement reliability (subject to possible cost/benefit
considerations). Under this view, the ISB would solicit the views of stakeholders and be
informed by their perceptions, but it would not base its decisions on the potential impact of
the standard on financial statement credibility or stakeholder confidence in financial statement
reliability. This variation reflects the view that enhancing credibility and stakeholder
confidence should not be part of the goals of auditor independence—improving financial
statement reliability is the only appropriate goal of auditor independence. Basic Principle 9C
would still apply, but the ISB’s focus would be on the goal of improved financial statement
reliability. Under this view, if ISB standards improve financial statement reliability (and an
effective system exists that ensures compliance with those standards), audit failures related to
impaired independence should be rare, and stakeholders’ long-term views about the
independence of auditors should reflect that reality. Effective communication and reliable
financial statements would be the means by which independence standards would enhance
financial statement credibility and stakeholder confidence in financial statement reliability.
Independence standards themselves would not be based on whether they enhanced financial
statement credibility or stakeholder confidence.

****
182. Regardless of the ISB’s views about stakeholders’ perceptions, effective two-way
communication between the ISB and stakeholders can help shape their opinions about the ISB,
the process by which independence standards are promulgated, and the standards themselves,
and ultimately enhance stakeholders’ confidence in the independence of auditors generally.
The ISB can provide a variety of opportunities for stakeholders to furnish timely input—for
example, stakeholder representation on task forces and working groups, presentations and
panel discussions with stakeholder groups on issues of mutual concern, and broad distribution
of discussion memoranda and exposure drafts to encourage stakeholders to share their views
with the ISB. At various stages in the standard-setting process, the ISB can communicate its
views on the nature of the threats that it believes are posed in the circumstances under
consideration and the reasons why the ISB believes that additional safeguards are or are not
the best solution in those circumstances. The Board also can explain the bases for its
conclusions, both in the ISB standards and through other media. Efforts by the ISB to ensure
effective communications with stakeholders may serve to increase stakeholders’ confidence in
the organizations and processes involved in maintaining auditor independence as well as in
financial statement reliability and the independence of auditors generally.
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APPENDIX A

Glossary
This appendix contains definitions of certain terms or phrases used in this Discussion
Memorandum.

Auditee
The entity whose financial statements are being audited.

Competence

When applied to an auditor, the ability to develop an appropriate audit plan, to select
suitable auditing procedures to test management’s assertions, to draw proper
conclusions regarding the conformity of the financial statements with GAAP, and to
render the appropriate auditor’s report.

Credibility

The quality of information that makes it believable.

Diligence

When applied to an auditor, approaching an audit with professional skepticism,
efficient and careful handling of technical matters, and a willingness to devote adequate
time and appropriate effort in performing an audit.

Information risk
The risk that users will make incorrect investment and credit decisions because the
financial statements used in making those decisions contain material misstatements.

Integrity
When applied to an auditor, honesty, trustworthiness, candor, and truthfulness in
performing an audit and making judgments regarding the financial statements’
conformity with GAAP.
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Objectivity
When applied to an auditor, impartiality—the ability to suppress any existing biases
when obtaining and evaluating audit evidence and making audit judgments.

Partner

A person in an auditing firm (regardless of the legal form of organization) who is
ultimately responsible for ensuring that the audit is planned, conducted, and reported
on in accordance with the firm’s policies and generally accepted auditing standards, as
well as those in the firm’s chain of command to whom that person reports.

Public entity

An entity that is required to file financial statements with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Quality audit

An audit performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.

Reliability

“The quality of information that assures that information is reasonably free from error
and bias and faithfully represents what it purports to represent.”83 (Financial
statements typically purport to represent that an entity’s financial position, results of
operations, and cash flows are presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.)

Safeguards to auditor independence

Controls—including prohibitions, restrictions, other policies and procedures, and
disclosures—that exist or could be put in place by standard setters, regulators, or
auditing firms that mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence.

83 FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information (Stamford, CT: FASB, 1980), “Glossaiy of Terms.”
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Stakeholders in auditor independence

Auditees, auditors and auditing firms, regulators, users of audited financial statements,
and others who may be affected by or who have an interest in the independence of
auditors.

Threats to auditor independence

Factors—including pressures, activities, and relationships—that could impair auditor
independence.

Users
Investors, creditors, and others who use audited financial statements in making
investment and credit decisions.

65

APPENDIX B
Examples of Goals of Auditor Independence
This appendix contains examples of goals of auditor independence found in a variety of
authoritative and nonauthoritative sources in addition to those discussed in Section III. The
examples are divided into two groups that roughly parallel the goals discussed in that section.
Within each group, the examples are in chronological order. In some cases, however, precise
chronological order was difficult to determine because it is unclear when some examples first
appeared in the literature.

Goals Related to Financial Statement Reliability

Examples in the first group, like Goals 1 and 2 (and related modifications) in Section III, focus
on the relationships among auditor independence, auditors’ personal attributes, and financial
statement reliability.

1

AICPA, Code ofProfessional Conduct (New York: AICPA, 1998 edition), ET
Section 55.01.

Objectivity is a state of mind, a quality that lends value to a member’s services. It is a
distinguishing feature of the profession. The principle of objectivity imposes the
obligation to be impartial, intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest.
Independence precludes relationships that may appear to impair a member’s
objectivity in rendering attestation services.

2

Robert K. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, “Audit Independence: Concept and
Application,” CPA Journal (March 1992), p. 35.

What does it mean to say that the auditor is independent of the assertion [e.g., the
financial statements] or without bias with respect to the assertion? It means that there
is no bias of any kind with respect to the assertion, and it also means, by inference,
that there are no interests causing bias. However, it makes no sense to ban the
auditor’s interest in the reliability (or truth) of the assertion. Therefore, the auditor
should have no interest in the financial statements except their reliability.
3

Steven M. H. Wallman, “The Future of Accounting, Part III: Reliability and
Auditor Independence,” Accounting Horizons (December 1996), p. 79.

After all, the ultimate goal of auditor independence is not independence for its own
sake—although that is a goal that some seem to seek. Rather, it is to ensure the
ongoing reliability of accounting and financial reporting and the effectiveness of our
system of capital formation.

67

4

AICPA, Serving the Public Interest: A New Conceptual Frameworkfor Auditor
Independence (White Paper) (New York: AICPA, 1997), pp. 14-15.

In operational terms, independence ensures that those who perform an audit or other
assurance engagement will be mentally objective when obtaining, examining, and
reporting on information. Independence, therefore, constitutes one of the cornerstones
of the accounting profession.
5

Robert K. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, “Audit Independence Concepts,” CPA
Journal (December 1998), p. 32.

A usefully stated objective of audit independence would capture both the cost and the
benefit side of the contribution to the capital markets. Here is the way such an
objective might be formulated:
The purpose ofaudit independence is to improve the cost effectiveness of the
capital markets.
This objective follows from the idea that the purpose of auditing is to improve the
cost-effectiveness of the capital markets (independence improves auditing, which
should improve the cost-effectiveness of the capital markets).

Goals Related to Perceptions, Credibility, and Confidence

A second group of examples of goals of auditor independence, like Goals 3 and 4 (and related
modifications), focuses on the relationship among independence, perceptions of various
groups of stakeholders, financial statement credibility, and stakeholders’ confidence.
6

SEC Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, Role of Independence in the
Auditing Process, Section 601.01 (originally issued as part of Accounting Series
Release No. 247, May 26,1978).
The role of the independent accountant as an outside expert has expanded. Auditors
now perform limited reviews of interim financial information and, on occasion, report
the results of such reviews in Commission filings. In addition, generally accepted
auditing standards require auditors to report to their clients material weaknesses in
internal accounting controls that come to their attention during an examination of
financial statements in accordance with such standards.
The increased participation by the independent accountant in the financial reporting
process makes it even more important that this relationship be fully understood and
appreciated by investors and other users of financial information. To sustain
confidence in financial statements by their users, the Commission and the accounting
profession require that auditors remain independent, both in fact and appearance, of
the companies they audit.
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7

SEC Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, Role of Independence in the
Auditing Process, Section 601.01 (originally issued as part of Accounting Series
Release No. 296, August 20, 1981).

The Commission continues to endorse and require scrupulous adherence to these
principles [of independence as defined by generally accepted auditing standards]. The
Commission views both the fact and appearance of independence as essential in order
that the public may justifiably view the audit process as a wholly unbiased review of
management’s presentation of the corporate financial picture. Through his audit and
certification, the auditor provides the means for independently checking and confirming
the information reported by corporations. Independence is thus of vital importance to
investors, creditors, agencies of government and others who rely on the public
accountant’s opinion that financial statements fairly reflect the financial position and
results of operations of the enterprise which he has audited. Absent independence, in
fact and appearance, investors will have little confidence in public companies as
investment vehicles.

8

Auditing Standards Board, Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Auditor
Independence, Statement of Auditing Practice AUP 32,1992, para. 6.
The concept of independence is fundamental to auditing, since the auditor’s objective
is to enhance, through the expression of an independent opinion, the credibility of the
reported financial information of an entity. The value of the independent audit lies
both in the fact that the auditor is, and is seen to be, independent of the audited entity,
and hence is able to carry out the audit free of any externally imposed constraints.

9

Office of the Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff
Report on Auditor Independence (March 1994), p. 2.
The independence of accountants who audit the financial statements included in filings
with the Commission is crucial to the credibility of financial reporting and, in turn, the
capital formation process. The public confidence in the reliability of issuers’ financial
statements that is provided by the performance of independent audits encourages
investment in securities issued by public companies. This sense of confidence
depends on reasonable investors perceiving auditors as independent professionals who
have neither mutual nor conflicting interests with their audit clients and who exercise
objective and impartial judgment on all issues brought to their attention.

10

Steven M. H. Wallman, “The Future of Accounting, Part III: Reliability and
Auditor Independence,” Accounting Horizons (December 1996), p. 79.
Finally, an examination of auditor independence also involves consideration of not only
the realities, but also the public’s perception, of independence. Some argue, credibly,
that this should not be the case. However, these two factors do interact, and although
public perception may not always be based on fact, it is important to the public’s
confidence in accounting information.
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APPENDIX C
Examples of Definitions of Auditor Independence
This appendix contains examples of both definitions and descriptions of auditor independence
found in a variety of authoritative and nonauthoritative sources in addition to those discussed
in Section IV. The examples are divided into five groups; the first three groups roughly
parallel the sequence of the definitions discussed in that section. Within each group, the
examples are presented in chronological order. In some cases, however, precise chronological
order was difficult to determine because it is unclear when some examples first appeared in the
literature.

Personal Attributes Approach
Examples in the first group, like Definitions 1, 2, and 3 in Section IV, are based on a personal
attributes approach, focusing on the qualities that individual auditors should'possess.

1

John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Public Accounting (New York: American
Institute of Accountants, 1946), p. 7.
Independence is an abstract concept, and it is difficult to define either generally
or in its peculiar application to the certified public accountant. Essentially it is
a state of mind. It is partly synonymous with honesty, integrity, courage,
character. It means, in simplest terms, that the certified public accountant will
tell the truth as he sees it, and will permit no influence, financial or sentimental,
to turn him from that course.

2

Carey, Professional Ethics ofPublic Accounting, pp. 20-21.

But independence has come to have a special meaning to certified public
accountants in conjunction with auditing and expressing opinions on financial
statements. Here independence has come to be almost a “term of art.” The
reason is that investors, credit grantors, prospective purchasers of businesses,
regulatory agencies of government, and others may rely on a certified public
accountant's opinion that financial statements fairly reflect the financial
position and results of operations of the enterprise which he has audited. It is
most important that the CPA not only shall refuse to subordinate his judgment
to that of others but that he be independent ofany self-interest which might
warp his judgment even subconsciously in reporting whether or not the
financial position and net income are fairly presented. Independence in this
context means objectivity or lack of bias in forming delicate judgments.
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3

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Code of Professional Ethics
(AICPA: New York, 1977 edition), ET Section 52.02. 84

Independence has traditionally been defined by the profession as the ability to
act with integrity and objectivity.

Activities and Relationships Approach
Examples in the second group, like Definitions 4, 5, and 6 in Section IV, are based on an
activities and relationships approach that emphasizes external indicators of auditor
independence.

4

Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF), “Auditor Independence,”
Statement of Auditing Practice (AUP) 32 (Melbourne: AARF, 1992), para. 7.

The professional ethical pronouncements ... define independence as a freedom
from any interest incompatible with integrity and objectivity..

5

AICPA, Serving the Public Interest: A New Conceptual Frameworkfor Auditor
Independence (White Paper) (New York: AICPA, 1997), p. 7.

For purposes of the new framework, independence would be defined as an
absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk of bias with respect to the
quality or context of information that is the subject of an audit engagement.
6

New Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA), “Guideline on Integrity,
Objectivity and Independence,” Ethical Guideline No. 1 (Wellington: NZSA,
1982 [revised 1991]), para. 9.

Independence has come to have a special meaning to members [of the New
Zealand Society of Accountants] in conjunction with professional engagements
resulting in opinions on financial information. In this sense, independence
means avoidance of situations which would tend to impair objectivity or create
personal bias which would influence judgments.
7

Robert K. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, “Audit Independence Concepts,” CPA
Journal (December 1998), p. 34.

Audit independence is an absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk
of material bias with respect to the reliability of financial statements.

84 This language was included by the SEC in Accounting Series Release No. 296 (August 20, 1981). See SEC
Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, Section 601.01.
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Focus on Perceptions, Credibility, and Confidence

The third group of examples, like the definitions and additions in Section IV beginning with
Definition 7, focuses on the perceptions of users of financial statements and other
stakeholders as well as on the goals of auditor independence that deal with enhancing financial
statement credibility and stakeholder confidence.
8

AICPA, Code ofProfessional Conduct (New York: AICPA, 1998 edition), ET
Section 55.01.

Objectivity is a state of mind, a quality that lends value to a member’s services.
It is a distinguishing feature of the profession. The principle of objectivity
imposes the obligation to be impartial, intellectually honest, and free of
conflicts of interest. Independence precludes relationships that may appear to
impair a member's objectivity in rendering attestation services.

9

Independence Issues Committee, Materiality Task Force, “Preliminary
Analysis of the Use of the Materiality Concept for Independence Purposes”
(unpublished, 1998), p. 1 (footnote omitted).
An auditor is independent when informed investors, knowing all the facts and
circumstances surrounding relevant relationships, matters and situations, would
conclude that there is no more than an insignificant risk that auditor objectivity
would be impaired.

10

SEC, Financial Reporting Release No. 50: The Establishment and Improvement of
Standards Related to Auditor Independence (Washington, DC: SEC, February 18,
1998), Section I.

Pursuant to the Commission’s regulations, the basic test for auditor
independence is whether a reasonable investor, knowing all relevant facts and
circumstances, would perceive an auditor as having neither mutual nor
conflicting interests with its audit client and as exercising objective and
impartial judgment on all issues brought to the auditor’s attention. In
determining whether an auditor is independent, the Commission considers all
relevant facts and circumstances, and its consideration is not confined to the
relationships existing in connection with the filing of reports with the
Commission.

Multidimensional Approach
A fourth approach to describing independence found in the literature views the concept of
independence as having several dimensions, each of which requires a separate description or
definition.
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11

John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Public Accounting (New York: American
Institute of Accountants, 1946), pp. 21-22.

To sum up, independence has two meanings to the certified public accountant.
First, in the sense of not being subordinate, it means an aspect of integrity,
which is expected of all professional men, and enables them to accept
responsibility. Second, in the narrower sense in which it is used in conjunction
with auditing and expressing opinions on financial statements, independence
means avoidance of any relationships which might, even subconsciously,
impair the CPA’s objectivity as auditor.
12

Carman G. Blough, “Responsibility to Third Parties,” Journal of Accountancy
(May 1960), p. 60.
When considering independence, one must not only look at his own mind to see
whether the relationship is such that he feels there might be danger of his being
biased, he must also examine the situation and try to see how it would look
through the eyes of those who will be called upon to rely upon his
representation. One had better sacrifice the business that such a relationship
would bring than run the risk of letting his judgment be distorted to the point
where he might not be completely objective, or of destroying his usefulness by
appearing to others to be lacking in independence.

13

Robert K. Mautz and Hussein A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing (American
Accounting Association, 1961), pp. 204-05.

This is to say that real independence is of little value if those who read an
auditor's report refuse to acknowledge that independence does exist. Thus
there are two aspects of independence requiring attention if a useful concept is
to be developed; these are, first, the real independence of the individual
practitioner in the performance of his work and, second, the apparent
independence of auditors as a professional group. For the purposes of this
chapter, we will refer to these as “practitioner-independence” and “profession
independence” respectively.

The meaning of practitioner-independence seems clear. It has to do with the
ability of the individual practitioner to maintain the proper attitude in the
planning of his audit program, the performance of his verification work, and the
preparation of his report. Profession-independence has to do with the image of
auditors as a group brought to mind when the term “auditor” or CPA is used.
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14

D. R. Carmichael and R. J. Swieringa, “The Compatibility of Auditing
Independence and Management Services—An Identification of Issues,”
Accounting Review (October 1968), pp. 698-99.
Professional independence—This phase of independence is essential to the
practice of any profession. To attain professional independence, the auditor
must possess an approach and attitude which make him self-reliant and not
subordinate to his client. Additionally, the auditor must be free from control or
influence of management in making decisions based upon universal standards,
specificity of professional expertise, and authority based on his expertise.
Professional independence is based on control by self-imposed standards and
peer-group surveillance and, therefore, requires freedom from control by
superiors.
Audit independence—This phase of independence is peculiar to the CPA’s
function of examining and expressing opinions on financial statements. To
attain audit independence, the auditor must “be independent ofany self-interest
which might warp his judgment even subconsciously in reporting whether or
not the financial position and net income are fairly presented. Independence in
this context means objectivity or lack of bias in forming delicate judgments”
[Carey, Professional Ethics, pp. 20-21].
The freedom from bias and prejudice required to attain audit
independence carries an implication of duality. Not only must the auditor
refrain from intentionally favoring the client’s interests in planning his
examination, gathering evidence, and preparing his report, he must also avoid
any unintentional feelings which might cause him to take such actions. The
basic nature of these two situations is so divergent that they deserve separate
recognition. The question of avoidance of intentionally biased and prejudicial
action is referred to as “objective audit independence,” while the
subconsciously motivated facet is referred to as “subjective audit
independence.”

Perceived independence—[One aspect of this phase is that it] involves a
reasonable and knowledgeable individual’s perception of an individual
practitioner’s independence.. .. The other phase of perceived independence,
then, is the general public’s perception of the profession as a whole. The
perceived independence of auditors as a professional group is something quite
different from the perceived independence of an individual practitioner; the
former is a matter of professional image, while the latter is an evaluation of
singular circumstances. Accordingly, the appearance of independence should
be recognized as a dichotomy, composed of “individual perceived
independence” and “group perceived independence.”
Another important facet of this two-fold phase of independence is the
fact that it is solely a matter of perception. . .. This means that an observer’s
opinion will be based, not on the objective features of a situation, but on the
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meaning that situation has for him. This facet of perceived independence
should not be ignored.
15

Federation Des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE), Statutory Audit
Independence and Objectivity (Brussels: FEE, 1998), p. 8 and note 1.
Independence1 is the main means by which the statutory auditor
demonstrates that he can perform his task in an objective manner. In dealing
with independence, one must address both:
• Independence of mind, i.e., the state of mind which has regard to
all considerations relevant to the task in hand but no other; and
• Independence in appearance, i.e., the avoidance of facts and
circumstances which are so significant that an informed third party
would question the statutory auditor’s objectivity.
1 Use of the word ‘independence’ on its own has often created
misunderstandings in discussing this topic because standing alone the word
appears to denote an absolute standard which professionals must attain. It
leads observers to suppose that a person exercising professional judgement
ought to be free from all economic, financial, and other relationships which
appear to entail dependence of any kind. This is manifestly impossible, as
every member of society has some dependency and relationship with every
other.

16

International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), “Independence—Proposed
Changes to the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants” (New York: IFAC,
August, 1999), paras. 8.1-8.4 (footnotes omitted).

It is in the public interest, and therefore required by IFAC’s Code of Ethics,
that professional accountants in public practice who undertake reporting
assignments be independent of the entities on which they are reporting and the
subject matter of their reports.
Independence requires the qualities of objectivity and integrity. Objectivity is
the intellectual quality of freedom from bias; integrity is the moral quality of
honesty. Both qualities relate to independence of mind.
In addition to independence of mind, the public interest requires that reporting
accountants be concerned about the appearance of independence.
Relationships with clients that may appear to affect judgments by the
reporting accountant present threats or risks to independence. Reporting
accountants have an obligation to evaluate those relationships and to take
appropriate action to eliminate the threats and risks, or to reduce them to
acceptable levels. Such evaluation and action should be supported by evidence
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prepared before accepting the reporting assignment and during the course of
the assignment.

The reporting accountant must be both (a) independent of mind, and (b)
independent in appearance.

17

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants/National Association of State
Boards of Accountancy, Exposure Draft, “Proposed Model Code of Conduct”
(August 18,1999 revised), Principle VII.
A licensee should be independent in fact and appearance. Independence in fact
is the absence of a licensee’s interest in, relationship with, or services provided
to, a person or entity, that results in the licensee’s loss of objectivity.
Independence in appearance is the absence of such interests, relationships, or
services which may, to a reasonable person having knowledge of all the facts,
appear to result in an unacceptable threat to the licensee’s objectivity.

When considering independence issues, it is presumed that the reasonable
person would consider, among other factors:
• A licensee’s normal strength of character under the circumstances;
• Pressures that may be exerted on the licensee by clients and others;
• The countervailing pressures of legal liability and professional discipline,
including loss of reputation and license; and
• The safeguards established by the profession for the licensee’s practice
entity, such as peer review and quality control standards.

Academic Approaches

A fifth group of definitions and descriptions of auditor independence includes those developed
by academic researchers writing about positive accounting theory, developing theoretical
models, and describing empirical research. Although these examples are not intended to be
operational definitions, they do provide another view of auditor independence.
Positive theory views auditing as one of the methods by which contracts among owners,
managers, and stockholders can be monitored. Audits provide value only if the parties to the
contract believe that the probability that the auditor will report a breach of the provisions of
the contract is greater than zero.

18

Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986), pp. 314-15 and note 3.

The probability an auditor reports a breach, conditional on a breach occurring,
depends on
1. The probability that the auditor discovers a given breach
2. The probability that the auditor reports the discovered breach
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The first probability (discovery) depends on the auditor’s competence and the
quantity of inputs devoted to the audit. The second probability (reporting)
refers to the auditor’s independence from the client. If the client pressures
the auditor to not disclose a discovered breach, will the auditor withstand the
client’s pressure?
To create a demand for audit services, auditors have to convince the market that
they have some competence (i.e., there is a nonzero probability the auditor will
discover a breach) and that they will have some independence from the client
(i.e., there is a nonzero probability that the auditor will report a discovered
breach). The market will only be convinced of the latter if auditors stand to
lose something by never reporting breaches. If auditors have nothing to lose by
succumbing to managerial pressures not to report a breach and if managers can
impose costs on them, auditors will succumb.

Since voluntary corporate auditing has survived for over 600 years ...
institutions and contractual arrangements must exist that provide the auditor
with incentives to be independent, to resist the manager’s pressures. Those
institutions and arrangements include the auditor’s reputation, professional
societies, the audit firm’s organizational form, and large-scale audit firms.
Further, the institutions and contractual arrangements have evolved over time
as the capital market’s structure has changed.
3

Note that we do not expect auditors to be totally independent (i.e., report
discovered breaches with probability 1). The auditor trades off the cost of
reporting and not reporting a discovered breach, and there is no reason to
believe that an extreme policy is adopted.

Researchers also have spent considerable effort developing models of the market for audits
that have included definitions of auditor independence.
19

Linda E. DeAngelo, “Auditor Independence, ‘Low Balling,' and Disclosure
Regulation,” Journal of Accounting and Economics (August 1981), p. 116
(footnote omitted).
The level of auditor independence is defined as the conditional probability that,
given a breach has been discovered, the auditor will report the breach.

20

Robert P. Magee and Mei-Chiun Tseng, “Audit Pricing and Independence,”
Accounting Review (April 1990), p. 317.

[We] define independence as an auditor’s making reporting decisions consistent
with his or her beliefs as to whether the reporting decision may be regarded as
an audit failure. That is, an auditor compromises his or her independence when
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he or she allows the client to use a reporting policy that he or she believes
would be viewed as an audit failure.

Other researchers have developed formal theoretical models of the manager-auditorstockholder relationship based on the principles of game theory. In the context of auditors
and managers cooperating in pursuing their own self-interests, some of these models include
analytical definitions of alternative expressions of auditor independence.85
21

Mark Penno and John S. Watts, “An Independent Auditor’s Ex Post Criteria for
the Disclosure of Information,” Journal of Accounting Research (Supplement
1991), p. 195.
If the auditor’s preferences over disclosures depend neither directly on
management’s wishes nor indirectly on management’s preferences (for example,
through future audit fees), one could say that the auditor is “independent.”

85 See, for example, Rick Antle, “The Auditor as an Economic Agent,” Journal of Accounting Research
(Autumn 1982), pp. 503-27, and “Auditor Independence,” Journal of Accounting Research (Spring 1984), pp.
1-20.
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